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ABSTRACT 
 
How effectively governments can use tobacco tax as a public health and a revenue-generating 
measure depends on how able smokers are to circumvent the tax by switching to other tobacco 
products. Recently, tobacco product switching has become more common, especially with many 
new tobacco product types appearing on the market. The research on these switching behaviors is 
scarce. This thesis provides analysis in three aspects tobacco product switching: (1) price-driven 
between-product substitution, (2) switching to newly-introduced tobacco products and (3) 
switching to products on which no domestic tax has been paid. 
When the ratio of tobacco product prices changes, consumers sometimes choose to switch between 
products. Zambia, with a high prevalence of roll-your-own (RYO) tobacco, a less costly alternative 
to factory-made (FM) cigarettes, is a case in point. The study presented in the second chapter of 
this thesis used individual-level data obtained from the 2012 and 2014 waves of the ITC Zambia 
Survey to model the probability of FM and RYO cigarette smoking, as well as between-product 
substitution. It found that increasing the cigarette tax, with corresponding price increases, could 
significantly reduce cigarette use in Zambia. Furthermore, reducing between-product price 
differences would reduce substitution from FM to RYO.  
With the proliferation of many new tobacco product types, traditional cigarettes are becoming less 
dominant. With the introduction of a new product to the market, between-product switching might 
not be influenced purely by price differences across product types, but rather driven by the 
increased variety of products on the market. Chapter three makes use of a natural experiment 
created during the rollout of a heated tobacco product, IQOS, in 2015 and 2016 in Japan to examine 
if trends in cigarette sales have changed with the introduction of IQOS in each region. A series of 
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placebo models are estimated to test if events other than IQOS introduction could have better 
explained trends in cigarette sales. The results show that the introduction of IQOS likely reduced 
cigarette sales in Japan. 
Large differences in cigarette prices observed between geographical regions might incentivize 
some smokers from regions with higher cigarette prices to switch to cheaper cigarettes available 
across the border. The fourth chapter uses 2004-2017 official European Commission data and a 
methodology developed by Becker (1990), to analyze the association between prices and cross-
border cigarette purchases in the European Union. Incentives for cross-border purchasing are 
measured as a function of differences in cigarette prices between bordering countries, controlling 
for population density near borders and for gasoline prices. The scale of cross-border cigarette 
purchasing in the EU is small, and not-significant through maritime borders. An upward 
convergence of cigarette prices across EU Member States would further reduce the cross-border 
purchasing problem. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Globally, as many as 100 million people died in the 20th century due to tobacco use and, if the 
current tobacco use patterns persist, it is predicted that in the 21st century, tobacco will kill another 
1 billion people (Drope et al. 2018). Tobacco smoking causes cancer in at least 15 body organs 
(American Cancer Society 2016) and more than 20% of all cancer deaths worldwide are tobacco-
attributable and therefore completely preventable (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
2013). It also increases the risk of cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases and exacerbates the 
course of other diseases, such as HIV and tuberculosis (Drope et al. 2018). Tobacco use is also a 
burden on countries’ economic development. It is estimated that the economic cost of smoking 
(including health expenditures and productivity losses) totaled nearly 2 trillion dollars (purchasing 
power adjusted) in 2016, equivalent in magnitude to almost 2% of the world's annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Goodchild, Nargis, and d’Espaignet 2017; Drope et al. 2018). These 
accounts of tobacco-related costs do not include the costs associated with undernutrition and 
underinvestment in education, as spending on tobacco products can divert resources from essential 
goods and services at a household level (Chelwa and Van Walbeek 2014). 
One of the fundamental tenets of economics is that when the price of a product increases, the 
quantity demanded falls. Therefore, to curb the health and economic burden of tobacco use, 
governments around the world tax tobacco products to decrease their demand. The mechanisms 
behind the relationship between tobacco taxes and tobacco product use are straightforward. If the 
tax increases are sufficient, those producing and selling tobacco products need to increase the retail 
price. When tobacco tax increases are small, the tobacco industry can shield its consumers from 
the taxes, keeping the retail price unchanged. This happened, for example, during the modest 
cigarette tax increases in Ukraine from January 2007 to August 2008 (Ross, Stoklosa, and 
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Krasovsky 2012). But, with larger tobacco tax increases, such as those in South Africa in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s (Van Walbeek 2005), the industry is unable to absorb the tax and needs 
to pass the taxes on to consumers, which is reflected in an increase in the price of tobacco products. 
The impact of tobacco tax on the demand for tobacco products comes through its effect on tobacco 
prices. A formal review of more than sixty studies on tobacco product demand in high-income 
countries (HICs), conducted by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, found that most 
of estimates of the price elasticity of tobacco demand lie between -0.2 and -0.6, centering around 
-0.4 (IARC 2011). This means that in a typical HIC country a 10% increase in the price of 
cigarettes decreases the demand by 4%. The evidence for cigarette price responsiveness in low- 
and middle-income countries (LMICs) is still insufficient, but the available studies indicate that 
cigarette demand in these countries is at least as elastic as, and possibly even more elastic than, 
the demand in HICs (IARC 2011).  
Tobacco tax increases that lead to higher tobacco product prices are among the most effective 
tobacco control measures available (World Health Organization 2015b). For example, out of the 
estimated 22 million tobacco-related deaths prevented by the strong tobacco control policies 
implemented between 2007 and 2014 globally, almost a third (7 million) were the result of 
increased tobacco taxes (Levy et al. 2018). In some places, the impact of tax on reduced cigarette 
consumption was even greater. For example, it is estimated that tobacco control policies 
implemented between 1991 and 2006 in Thailand had decreased smoking prevalence from 55.5% 
among men and 3.3% among women (predicted rates in the absence of policy change) to 41.7% 
among men and 2.5% among women (actual 2016 rates). Most of this decline was due to increased 
tobacco taxation (Figure 1.1) (Levy et al. 2008). Similarly, it is estimated that per capita cigarette 
consumption in South Africa in 2004 was 36% lower than it would have been in the absence of 
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the tobacco control measures implemented from 1994 to 2004, and that this consumption decline 
was mostly driven by tobacco tax increases (Chelwa, van Walbeek, and Blecher 2017). 
Figure 1.1. Impact of tobacco control in Thailand 
 
 
Source: American Cancer Society’s graph created based on data from Levy et al. 2008 
 
 
In addition to enhancing public health, tobacco excise taxes typically generate a steady and 
predictable government income, because tobacco products have few substitutes, relatively inelastic 
demand, and because taxes account for only a share of the tobacco product final price (Chaloupka, 
Yurekli, and Fong 2012). Currently, at least 168 countries in the world levy tobacco excise taxes, 
with 96% of the world’s population living in countries with some excise tax on tobacco products 
in place (World Health Organization 2015). Governments around the world collect more than US$ 
328 billion in tobacco excise taxes each year (Goodchild, Perucic, and Nargis 2016). The 
contribution of tobacco excise tax to overall government revenue is less than that of other taxes, 
such as value-added tax (VAT) and personal income tax, but is not negligible. In the 28 European 
Union Member States, for example, cigarette excise tax revenue, on average, accounts for 3% of 
61%
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total receipts from taxes and social contributions (European Commission’s Taxation and Customs 
Union 2018b; Eurostat 2019). 
It recently became clear that the importance of tobacco taxation extends far beyond the public 
health and revenue generation spheres (Stoklosa 2017). Increasingly, economists realize that 
global economic progress depends not only on income maximization, but also on healthy lives and 
the well-being of all people. As Angus Deaton argues: "Health is the obvious starting point for an 
enquiry into wellbeing. You need a life to have a good life..." (Deaton 2013). Deaton emphasizes 
that to enjoy the benefits of economic growth and prosperity, one needs to stay in good health. 
Furthermore, health is not only a matter of individual well-being, but also an important contributor 
to the world’s economic progress. In fact, it is estimated that about 24% of income growth in low-
income and middle-income countries worldwide between 2000 and 2011 resulted from health 
improvements (Jamison et al. 2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of income growth resulting 
from health improvements during that period was even higher, at 69% (Jamison et al. 2013). As 
health improvements and economic growth are mutually reinforcing factors for world 
development, policies that are effective in improving public health, such as tobacco taxation, 
significantly contribute to global progress. In fact, achieving some of the key development goals 
related to public health, such as reaching the Millennium Development Goal of reducing 
tuberculosis (TB) mortality, would in some places not be possible without strong tobacco control 
measures, including tobacco taxation, because of the inherent comorbidity between smoking and 
TB (Basu et al. 2011). Some of the tobacco tax revenue could also be allocated toward growth-
enhancing sectors such as education or health care, amplifying the benefits of tobacco taxes.  
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1.1. Existing research and models 
Tobacco markets have been a focus of economic deliberation for centuries, even before the 
relationship between tobacco smoking and adverse health consequences was established. As a non-
necessity good, tobacco has been considered an “extremely proper subject of taxation” (Smith 
1776) and, therefore, various authorities looked at tobacco products as a source of government 
revenue. For example, in North America, tobacco was taxed first by the British, then by the 
independent United States (US) republic in the early 1790s, and subsequently by the US federal 
government, in part to finance the Civil War (Youths, Lynch, and Bonnie 1994).  
It was not until the mid-20th century that advances in econometrics and computing allowed 
economists to use empirical methods to analyze the determinants of demand for a variety of 
products, including tobacco (U.S. National Cancer Institute and World Health Organization 2016). 
These early studies used aggregate data and focused on a small number of developed economies. 
For example, in an article published in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society in 1945, Stone 
used annual time series data from the 1920s and 1930s to estimate price and income elasticities for 
many goods including spirits, soap, telegrams, and tobacco (Stone 1945). The price elasticities of 
tobacco demand estimated by Stone were -0.24 in the United States and -0.53 in the United 
Kingdom (Stone 1945).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, mounting evidence about the adverse consequences for health of tobacco 
use (Public Health Service 1964) precipitated a large number of  economic studies that investigated 
determinants of tobacco product demand. The early studies examined the effects of prices, as well 
as other factors such as advertising, income, and tastes and preferences, on the demand for tobacco 
products using macro-level aggregate data on cigarette consumption (U.S. National Cancer 
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Institute and World Health Organization 2016). In the 1990s, studies begun to use data from 
household- and individual-level surveys (Chaloupka et al. 2000). During the 1990s, and especially 
after 2000, evidence from low- and middle-income countries also began to accumulate (U.S. 
National Cancer Institute and World Health Organization 2016). The increase in the number of 
economic analyses of tobacco demand was facilitated by further advancements in econometric 
methodology and in computer technology, and by better data.  
Since the early 2000s, a substantial body of evidence on the determinants of tobacco product 
demand has accumulated. A recent formal review by the U.S. National Cancer Institute (NCI) and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) finds overwhelming evidence confirming the role of 
tobacco taxation in reducing cigarette use, generating revenue, and reducing tobacco-related 
economic costs. This evidence, based on data from high-, middle-, and low-income countries, 
points not only to the effectiveness of tobacco tax policies, but also to their high cost-effectiveness 
(U.S. National Cancer Institute and World Health Organization 2016).  
Large national and international institutions have used this evidence to create models that predict 
the effects of future tobacco tax increases. These models are used by those organizations to inform 
policy change. For example, the World Health Organization’s work on designing, implementing 
and monitoring effective tobacco tax systems is supported by the Tobacco Tax Simulation 
(TaXSiM) model, an analytical tool directed at evaluating the impact of a change in the structure 
and level of excise taxes on cigarette use, smoking prevalence and government revenue (World 
Health Organization 2019). This model is widely used by other organizations, such as the World 
Bank (Marquez 2018). The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 
Knowledge Hub on Tobacco Taxation based at the University of Cape Town uses a different 
model, but one based on similar logic and principles as the TaXSiM model (World Bank 2018a). 
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Similarly, the economic model developed jointly by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (TFK), 
the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network (ACS CAN), and Tobacconomics (a 
program of the University of Illinois at Chicago) to predict the impact of tobacco tax increases on 
state revenues, public health benefits, and health care cost savings in the United States is also based 
on existing evidence on the demand for tobacco (ACS Cancer Action Network 2019).  
1.2. Smokers’ switching behaviours undermine the effectiveness of tobacco tax 
The ability of governments to use tobacco tax as a measure to improve public health and generate 
revenue is moderated by smokers’ ability to avoid or evade the tax. Instead of reducing their 
consumption, quitting, or paying the full tax amount, some smokers may circumvent the tax by 
switching to other tobacco products. There are many product types available in the global tobacco 
market, including machine-made cigarettes, cigars and cigarillos, pipe tobacco, manufactured 
tobacco used for hand-rolled cigarettes, and water pipe tobacco, as well as smokeless tobacco such 
as snuff and snus. There is also a variety of tobacco products that are being used only locally, such 
kretek cigarettes, made with a blend of tobacco and cloves and smoked in Indonesia, or locally-
grown tobacco used for rolling cigarettes in Zambia. Finally, there is a range of recently-introduced 
novel tobacco products such as Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS) and heated tobacco 
products (HTPs). ENDS are electronic devices aerosolizing a liquid containing varying amounts 
of nicotine, while HTPs heat a processed tobacco leaf substance to a high temperature, slightly 
short of combustion. 
Significant differences between the prices of different tobacco products can create opportunities 
for product substitution. If the price increase of one good results in an increase in demand for 
another good, that is, if the cross-price elasticity is positive, then the two goods are classified as 
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substitutes. In such cases, when the price of a tobacco product goes up, instead of reducing their 
tobacco consumption, some tobacco users switch to other, less expensive products. Studies have 
shown that when the price ratio of tobacco products changes, consumers sometimes choose to 
switch from the relatively more expensive to the relatively less expensive product (IARC 2011). 
This substitution between tobacco product types almost always goes against efforts to use taxation 
as a health-promoting tool. For example, when the U.S. federal government increased the excise 
tax on roll-your-own (RYO) tobacco in 2009, it created a substantial price difference between 
RYO tobacco and pipe tobacco. Within one year, RYO tobacco sales dropped by 61%, while pipe 
tobacco sales increased by 233% (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2015). 
Existing tax systems often promote between-product substitution, mostly unintentionally. Out of 
71 countries where information was gathered on taxes for the most commonly-used smoked or 
smokeless tobacco products in 2016, at least one of those other products was taxed at a lower rate 
than cigarettes in 51 (72%) of those countries (World Health Organization 2017). The differences 
in price, in part resulting from differential tax burdens, encourage smokers to switch to the less 
expensive product.  
Another factor that has affected smokers’ ability to avoid high tobacco product taxes recently is 
the introduction and expansion of novel tobacco products such ENDS and HTPs. Some current 
smokers have switched to these new products. Moreover, never-users, including those who would 
not otherwise use any tobacco products at all, might start using tobacco or tobacco-derived 
products through such products.. In that case, the smokers switching between different tobacco 
products might not be reacting simply to price differences across different product types, but also 
to the growth in the variety of products that are available to tobacco users and potential users, some 
of which may be less harmful or more appealing than traditional combustible tobacco products. 
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The market power of cigarettes is being decreased by the introduction of these new products, 
especially since the new products are heavily marketed by the manufacturers.  
Finally, the third way for smokers to avoid or evade tobacco taxes is by switching to tobacco 
products on which domestic tax has not been paid. This type of switching behavior often occurs 
when prices of the same product substantially differ across geographical regions. In such case, 
tobacco users can choose to switch to tobacco products purchased from other regions where 
cigarette prices are lower. These products can be purchased by the users themselves (cross-border 
shopping), or by bootleggers, who then resell the products to the users. This substitution, again, 
weakens the effectiveness of the tax and undermines its public health objectives because smokers 
who substitute to cheaper cigarettes from other jurisdictions may be less likely to quit or cut down 
on their tobacco consumption. Such substitution also undermines the effects of other tobacco 
control regulations. For example, cigarettes from a neighboring country may not comply with 
stronger package warning requirements in the smoker’s home country.  
It is estimated that illicit cigarettes account for about 12% of the cigarette market globally 
(Joossens et al. 2010). According to the most recent data from the World Customs Organization, 
only about 2% of those illicit cigarettes are counterfeits (i.e. 0.24% of the total cigarette market), 
meaning that an overwhelming majority of illicit cigarettes were produced by legitimate or semi-
legitimate tobacco companies (Gilmore, Gallagher, and Rowell 2018). At a country level, there is 
often a lack of credible estimates of the scope of the illicit cigarette trade problem (Ross 2015) and 
much of the existing evidence comes from the tobacco industry (Gallagher et al. 2019). The 
tobacco industry uses the threat of an increase in the illicit cigarette trade to argue against tobacco 
tax hikes (Schwartz and Zhang 2016) and  many other life-saving tobacco control policies, such 
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as standardized packaging (Evans-Reeves, Hatchard, and Gilmore 2015) and bans on menthol 
cigarettes (Stoklosa 2018c).  
1.3. Research gaps 
Policymakers’ ability to introduce evidence-based policies aimed at reducing tobacco product use 
through tax-induced price increases depends on evidence from credible economic research. 
However, there are still large gaps in the research, particularly around smokers’ switching 
behaviors. This lack of research hinders evidence-based policymaking.  
In fact, the lack of research on smokers’ switching behaviours is one of the largest research gaps 
identified by the influential NCI-WHO monograph on the economics of tobacco control. Most of 
the existing research examines the impacts of tobacco taxes on cigarette use only and “few studies 
have assessed the price elasticity of demand for tobacco products other than cigarettes, and even 
fewer have estimated cross-price elasticities” (U.S. National Cancer Institute and World Health 
Organization 2016). In part as a result of their recent introduction and popularity, research on the 
relationships between novel tobacco products and the use of traditional, combustible tobacco 
products is particularly scarce. Research on the determinants of the illicit cigarette trade, including 
on the role cigarette taxes and prices play in shaping the illegal market, is growing but is still 
relatively limited. The NCI-WHO monograph notes that: “A better understanding of the 
determinants of illicit trade—including the supply of illicit tobacco products—is needed in order 
to maximize the effectiveness of interventions to limit illicit trade.” (U.S. National Cancer Institute 
and World Health Organization 2016). 
Secondly, even with the limited research on smokers’ switching behaviors, the modelling of those 
behaviors is insufficient. The models currently in use, although very precise in predicting cigarette 
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sales, largely ignore smokers’ switching behaviors. Both the WHO TaXSiM model and the ACS 
CAN/TFK model focus on cigarettes only and are not programmed to account for switching 
between tobacco product types, including switching to novel tobacco products such as e-cigarettes 
or HTPs. Furthermore, modelling of smokers’ switching to non-domestic-tax-paid cigarettes needs 
more attention globally: while the ACS CAN/TFK model allows for the modelling of cross-border 
purchasing, the WHO TaXSiM model does not. 
This lack of focus on smokers’ switching behaviors made sense historically, when cigarettes were 
by far the most used tobacco product globally. According to Euromonitor International, a market 
research company, cigarette sales accounted for 92% of the market in 2012 (Euromonitor 
International 2019). This dominance of one product is reflected in the tobacco-related mortality 
and morbidity patterns. It is estimated that out of the 7.1 million deaths caused by tobacco use in 
2016, 6.3 million were attributable to cigarette smoking, followed at a distance by secondhand 
smoke (884,000 deaths) (Drope et al. 2018).  
While machine-made cigarettes dominated the tobacco market until the mid-2010s, their relative 
importance has recently begun to decline, with cigarettes’ share of the total tobacco market falling 
from 92% in 2012 to 88% in 2018 (Euromonitor International 2019). Two main factors contributed 
to this decline. First, traditional non-cigarette tobacco products – such as RYO – that previously 
occupied only a small portion of the market, are slowly gaining importance. For example, the sales 
volume of smoking tobacco, which includes pipe tobacco and tobacco for RYO cigarettes, 
increased from 198 million to 206 million tonnes between 2012 and 2016 (5% increase) 
(Euromonitor International 2019). 
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More recently, many novel electronic tobacco product types have appeared on the market. Global 
market value of these products increased on average by 52% annually from 2010 to 2018 and 
amounted to 25 billion USD in 2018. While this is small in comparison to the cigarette market, 
estimated at 839 billion USD (Euromonitor International 2019), it has grown very sharply in a 
short period of time, and growth has been mostly concentrated in a limited number of markets. 
The shifts in the tobacco market will almost certainly continue in years to come. Euromonitor 
predicts that by 2022, cigarettes will account for 85% of the global tobacco market, a figure still 
high, but already substantially lower than the cigarette-share figure of 92% in 2012 (Euromonitor 
International 2019). The tobacco industry predicts even more remarkable shifts. For example, 
Philip Morris International, one of the world’s largest cigarette manufacturers, predicts in its most 
recent report to investors that novel tobacco products will account for over 30% of the company’s 
sales volume and over 38% of the company’s total net revenues globally by 2025 (Philip Morris 
International 2018a). This suggests that future tobacco market shifts away from traditional 
cigarettes are inevitable. 
1.4. Thesis outline 
This thesis addresses several key gaps in the literature by exploring the complexities surrounding 
differences in prices of tobacco products and the effects of the differences on the consumption of 
such products. It examines how price differentials can be affected by implementing and enforcing 
tobacco taxes in order to advance public health.  
Chapter two examines how the demand for tobacco products is affected by within-country 
variation in tobacco product prices. This chapter focuses on Zambia, a country with substantial 
differences in price between factory-made and RYO cigarettes. The analysis and results from this 
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chapter extend current knowledge about the role that differential prices play in between-product 
substitution. Because many, perhaps even most, countries have multiple categories of tobacco 
products, this knowledge can inform policymakers seeking to reduce the demand for all tobacco 
products by designing tax policies intended to decrease between-product price differentials. 
In chapter three, I examine the impact of the introduction of a heated tobacco product, IQOS, on 
trends in cigarette sales in Japan. Unlike the Zambian situation discussed in the second chapter, 
where the switching behavior occurs in a well-developed market and is driven mainly by between-
product price differences, the third chapter examines product-switching behaviors in 
circumstances in which it is not possible to estimate cross-price elasticities because of the lack of 
a fully-developed market and of price variation.  
Finally, chapter four focuses on tax and price differentials between different tax jurisdictions (EU 
countries), and the effects those differentials have on tobacco tax avoidance and evasion through 
cross-border purchasing. Specifically, the chapter uses 2004-2017 European Commission data and 
a methodology developed by Becker (1990) to analyze the association between prices and cross-
border cigarette purchases in the EU. Incentives for cross-border purchasing are measured as a 
function of differences in cigarette prices between bordering countries, controlling for population 
density near borders and for differences in gasoline prices between countries. As the threat of a 
rising illicit cigarette trade is one of the main arguments that the tobacco industry uses against 
cigarette tax increases, this chapter contributes to the scarce, non-industry-funded, evidence for 
the associations between tobacco tax increases and the consumption of non-domestic-tax-paid 
cigarettes.  
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A review by the U.S. National Cancer Institute and the World Health Organization identified the 
three aspects addressed in the three chapters of this thesis – namely the between-product cross-
price effects, the patterns of novel tobacco product use, and the determinants of illicit cigarette 
trade – as areas for which evidence is scarce, and additional research is still needed (U.S. National 
Cancer Institute and World Health Organization 2016). The aim of this thesis is to enhance 
knowledge on the economics of tobacco control and provide much-needed evidence that can 
inform future tobacco control policies. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: BETWEEN-PRODUCT PRICE DIFFERENTIALS1 
2.1. Introduction 
The limited economic research – mostly from high-income countries – on the cross-price effects 
in tobacco product use suggests that tobacco products are generally substitutes for one another 
(IARC 2011). This substitution effect has significant consequences for the effectiveness of tobacco 
control policies around the world. Whenever a new tobacco control policy is implemented, instead 
of quitting or cutting back, some smokers, given the opportunity, will choose to switch to other 
tobacco products. Typically, there is significant variation in the level of taxes applied to different 
tobacco products within each country. Different tax rates apply to different tobacco products, 
making some product types less expensive than others. For example, in the European Union – the 
region with the highest cigarette taxes in the world – the taxes on roll-your-own (RYO) cigarettes 
are significantly lower than on factory-made (FM) cigarettes. For the excise tax floor on RYO 
tobacco to be equivalent to the excise tax floor on FM cigarettes in 2015 (90 € per 1000 sticks), 
the RYO floor should be more than twice as high as the applicable tax floor (128.5 € per kilogram 
for the RYO tax to be equivalent to FM tax, as opposed to the actual RYO tax of 54 € per kilogram) 
(Lopez and Stoklosa 2018b). The tax gap means that FM cigarettes were significantly more 
expensive than RYO cigarettes. In 2015, the median cigarette price among EU member states was 
4.30 EUR (4.56 USD) per 20 sticks, while the median RYO price was 3.31 EUR (3.51 USD) per 
20 sticks (Lopez and Stoklosa 2018a). Similarly, in Indonesia – a country with one of the highest 
rates of male cigarette consumption in the world – hand-rolled kretek cigarettes have tax 
                                                          
1 This chapter is an updated version of manuscript previously published in the Tobacco Control journal (Stoklosa, 
Goma, et al. 2019). I would like to thank my co-authors Fastone Goma, Nigar Nargis, Jeffrey Drope, Grieve Chelwa, 
Zunda Chisha, and Geoffrey Fong as well as the three anonymous referees, for their valuable comments and inputs to 
this study. 
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advantages over FM cigarettes, which results in significant price differences between those 
products (Nargis et al. 2017). The variability in tax rates can reflect many factors, including interest 
groups’ influence, a desire to protect local farmers and/or manufacturers, and a desire to make the 
tax less regressive on the poor (Chaloupka, Yurekli, and Fong 2012). The variability in tobacco 
product taxes results in significant differences in prices across different tobacco products. When 
two products are substitutes, an increase in the price of one product increases the demand for the 
other product. Therefore, part of the reduction in consumption of one tobacco product in response 
to an increase in tax on that product will be offset by increases in consumption of other tobacco 
products, if the prices of those other products do not change. The exact magnitudes of these 
substitution effects are still understudied. 
The research presented in this chapter aims to explain this relationship. Using individual-level data 
obtained from the 2012 and 2014 waves of the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation 
Project survey in Zambia (ITC Project 2015), I model the probability of FM and RYO cigarette 
smoking in the country. The findings can be used by policymakers worldwide seeking to reduce 
tobacco product use through tax-induced price increases and to advance public health by designing 
tax policies that decrease between-product price differentials. 
This chapter reviews the available global evidence on substitution between tobacco products. It 
then introduces background information on tobacco production and use in Zambia, with a focus 
on tobacco product prices and taxes. Finally, it discusses the data and methods used for the study 
of between-product substitution in Zambia, presents the results of the study, and debates the 
implications of the findings for efforts to control tobacco use both in Zambia and globally. 
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2.1.1. Existing evidence on substitution between tobacco products 
From an economic perspective, two products are substitutes if a price increase in one leads to an 
increase in the demand for the other. In that sense, tobacco products are generally shown to be 
substitutes. A thorough literature review, conducted in 2011 by the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC), showed that higher cigarette prices and taxes typically encourage 
some substitution to bidis, cigars, loose tobacco, pipe tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and 
smokeless tobacco products (IARC 2011). A more recent review, however, shows that the 
relationships in switching between tobacco products might be more nuanced and might depend on 
country-specific tobacco use behaviors (Jawad et al. 2018). For example, while cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco products are shown to be substitutes in Bangladesh (Nargis, Hussain, and Fong 
2014), they are not found to be substitutes in India (Kostova and Dave 2015). This lack of 
substitution in India might result from the fact that smokeless tobacco use is more socially 
acceptable and is subject to fewer tobacco control regulations than regular cigarettes, leading to 
many Indian smokeless tobacco users never considering cigarettes as an alternative source of 
nicotine (Bandi 2019). 
Additionally, since the IARC review, a new body of evidence has emerged showing substitution 
between cigarettes and Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS). The early studies have 
shown that cigarette users move towards ENDS (Huang, Tauras, and Chaloupka 2014; Stoklosa, 
Drope, and Chaloupka 2016). For early studies, the analysis of movements from ENDS to 
cigarettes was difficult, because the ENDS market was tiny compared to the cigarette market. Any 
shift from ENDS to cigarettes could not be detected in modelling the demand for regular cigarettes. 
However, as the ENDS market accounts for an ever larger share of the total tobacco product market 
over time, the most recent studies have observed that the substitution is not only from cigarettes to 
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ENDS but also from ENDS to cigarettes (Zheng et al. 2017; Pesko and Warman 2017). The issue 
of substitution between cigarettes and ENDS is discussed in more detail in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
Only one study from Sub-Saharan Africa has investigated the impact of product prices on 
substitution among tobacco products (Van Walbeek 2005).That study used data from Income 
Expenditure Surveys in South Africa and found substitution between cigarettes and other tobacco 
products in response to relative price changes, but the magnitude of these effects was not 
calculated. 
2.1.2. Background on tobacco production and use in Zambia 
Smoking prevalence in Zambia is on a slow decline. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that the prevalence of current tobacco smoking among persons aged 15 years and over 
declined from 14.6% in 2010 to 13.8% in 2015 and, if the current trends persist, it is set to decline 
to 12.9% in 2025 (World Health Organization 2015a). However, owing to Zambia’s population 
growth (an annual rate of 3%), the number of tobacco users in Zambia is still on the rise (World 
Bank 2018b). Therefore, despite the falling rates of smoking prevalence, the number of current 
smokers in Zambia is set to increase from 1.2 million in 2015 to 1.5 million in 2025 (World Health 
Organization 2015a). The most recent survey of smoking prevalence in Zambia was the 
International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project Survey (ITC Project 2015), which found 
that 10.7% of adults (22.7% of men and 0.7% of women) aged 15–49 smoked cigarettes in Zambia 
in 2014 (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1. Prevalence of tobacco use among adults aged 15-49 in Zambia from the ITC 
Project Zambia Survey, 2014 
 Both sexes Males Females 
Any tobacco use 13.20% 23.60% 3.30% 
1. Smokeless tobacco use 2.38% 0.94% 2.61% 
2. Cigarette use 10.69% 22.66% 0.66% 
 Only or primarily FM cigarette use 6.31% - - 
 Only or primarily RYO cigarette use 4.17% - - 
 Dual use 0.21% - - 
 Source: ITC Project Zambia Survey, 2014  
Apart from the growing population, another reason for the continuing rise in the number of tobacco 
users in Zambia is likely the low price of cigarettes. As reported by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, a market research company that tracks prices of products and services in 133 cities 
worldwide, the price of a pack of cigarettes in Zambia increased in nominal terms from 3.9 ZMW 
(0.88 USD) in 2002 to 13.5 ZMW (1.30 USD) in 2017 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). But, 
when expressed in inflation-adjusted (constant 2016) prices, the price of cigarettes fell from 19.8 
ZMW in 2002 to 13.5 ZMW in 2017 (Figure 2.1). Compared to the prices of all goods and services 
in the economy, cigarettes are becoming less expensive over time in Zambia. 
In addition, cigarette prices have not kept pace with rising disposable incomes in Zambia (Chelwa 
2012). Over the last decade, the Zambian economy grew at an annual average rate of 6% (World 
Bank 2018b). The combination of falling real cigarette prices and a rapidly growing economy have 
made cigarettes more affordable over time. With 12.9% of per-capita gross domestic product 
needed to purchase 100 packs of the most popular brand of cigarettes in 2016, cigarettes in Zambia 
were more affordable than in the average African country (13.5%) (World Health Organization 
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2017). Survey data also point to the high affordability of cigarettes in Zambia; only 27% of male 
smokers and quitters from the ITC Project Zambia Survey reported that the price of cigarettes led 
them to think about quitting. This was the third lowest percentage among the 20 countries surveyed 
by the ITC Project (ITC Project 2015). 
Figure 2.1. Inflation-adjusted cigarette prices and the number of current smokers from 
2002 to 2017 in Zambia
 
Note: 2017 is the base year for inflation adjustment. Price of factory-made cigarettes (local brand; 
pack of 20; mid-priced store) from the Economist Intelligence Unit; inflation from the International 
Monetary Fund; number of current smokers from the World Health Organization. 
 
One factor that has great influence on cigarette prices is the excise tax on tobacco products. Despite 
high, often double-digit, inflation and rapid income growth, tobacco taxes have rarely increased in 
Zambia. Until 2017, the country’s cigarette excise tax was an ad valorem tax, with a specific tax 
floor. The ad valorem excise tax rate was introduced in 2007 and set at 145% of the Cost, Insurance 
and Freight (CIF) value for imported cigarettes or the Producer Price value for domestically 
produced cigarettes (Chelwa 2012). The specific tax floor was increased from 90 ZMW (8.72 
USD) to 200 ZMW (19.37 USD) per 1000 sticks in 2016 (Zambia Revenue Authority 2016). In 
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2017, the ad valorem component of the tax was removed, and the tax based on a specific rate 
(Parliament of Zambia 2017). The specific rate was increased to 240 ZMW (23.26 USD) per 1000 
sticks (Parliament of Zambia 2017), but this represents a mere adjustment for inflation back to the 
tax levels in 2007 when the tax floor was introduced. In 2016, tax comprised only 37% of the retail 
price of cigarettes of the most popular brand, compared to an average of 56% globally (World 
Health Organization 2017). Of the 188 countries for which the WHO publishes tax burden data, 
only 61 countries had a lower tax, as a percentage of cigarette price, than Zambia (World Health 
Organization 2017).  
Aside from low tobacco taxes, another factor that heavily influences the use of cigarettes in Zambia 
is the availability of roll-your-own (RYO) tobacco. In 2014, 39% of Zambian smokers smoked 
only or primarily RYO cigarettes (ITC Project 2015). The primary reason that the smokers gave 
for smoking RYO cigarettes was the lower prices of those products; 88% of smokers who smoked 
RYO said that they do so because of the price. The other reasons given for RYO cigarette use were 
taste (33%) and the perception that RYO cigarettes were less harmful (10%) (ITC Project 2015). 
Unlike the FM cigarettes, RYO cigarettes are predominantly smoked by lower-income groups 
(Figure 2.2). 
The fact that the low price of RYO tobacco compared to FM cigarettes is reported by almost all 
RYO users is striking, given that the tax rates on RYO tobacco and on FM cigarettes are 
comparable. In 2017, the ad valorem excise tax rate for RYO was the same as the rate for FM 
cigarettes (145% of CIF). The specific tax floor was at 240 ZMW per kilogram (Parliament of 
Zambia 2017), which would pair the RYO and FM taxes at the conversion rate of 1 gram of tobacco 
per cigarette. The fact that the price of a RYO cigarette reported by smokers in Zambia was often 
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Low (income below $1.25) Moderate (income from $1.25 to $1.99) High (income at $2.00 and above)
lower than the specific tax floor of 0.24 ZMW per stick (Table 2.4), suggests that much of the 
RYO tobacco is likely never taxed. 
Figure 2.2 Type of cigarette smoked by income group (USD per person per day) 
  
Note: N=2009; Source: ITC Zambia Survey Wave 2 
This is plausible, given that that much of the RYO tobacco comes straight from the Zambian 
tobacco farms (ITC Project 2015) to the informal marketplace, where the government, in most 
circumstances, has little ability to enforce taxes. Tobacco used for RYO cigarettes comes from two 
sources. The first source is manufactured tobacco called “Balani”, which is grown commercially 
in Zambia and often sold in plastic packaging. The second and more common source of RYO 
tobacco is small-scale farmers. These farmers grow tobacco in a traditional way, usually along 
river banks, with no fertilizers and pesticides, using local seeds. The farmers pack their products 
in a traditional way. This kind of RYO tobacco is usually sold by the farmer directly for 
consumption. The small scale of the production makes it extremely difficult to tax the product 
(Personal communication with Dr. Fastone Goma). The availability of the Zambian-grown RYO 
Smoke FM Smoke RYO
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tobacco which is not tax-compliant, in the market increases smoking in the country and keeps 
money from the Zambian treasury. 
Consequently, with cheap RYO tobacco widely and readily available in the market, many smokers 
switch from FM to RYO tobacco. The patterns are confirmed by data on the tobacco market in 
Zambia provided by Euromonitor International (2017). Euromonitor International is a market 
research company that conducts comprehensive market research on consumer products, 
commercial industries, demographic trends, and consumer lifestyles globally. Although the 
company does not track the tobacco product market in Zambia directly, it provides estimates on 
the size of that market. According to the Euromonitor estimates, the market for FM cigarettes in 
Zambia declined by 6% on a volume basis from 1.4 billion sticks in 2012 to 1.3 billion sticks in 
2017 (Table 2.2). At the same time, the market for smoking tobacco, which includes legally-sold 
RYO and pipe tobacco, remained stable at between 76 and 78 tonnes from 2012 to 2015, but 
increased to 89 tonnes in 2017. The market for other tobacco products (cigars and cigarillos) 
remained stable and was only a small portion of the total tobacco market, contributing 0.6 million 
units from 2012 and 2017. 
Table 2.2. Modelled retail volume of tobacco market in Zambia  
Category 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cigarettes (million sticks) 1,414.7 1,411.6 1,361.0 1,337.4 1,319.3 1,332.8 
Smoking Tobacco (tonnes) 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Cigars and Cigarillos (million units) 77.9 78.4 78.3 76.1 64.9 88.8 
Source: Euromonitor International 
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The lack of comprehensive tobacco control legislation in Zambia, despite the country being a Party 
to the WHO FCTC since 2008, is probably related to the fact that many policymakers and other 
key stakeholders continue to believe that tobacco is a major contributor to the Zambian economy 
(Lencucha et al. 2016). As in many other middle-income countries, the majority of the 17 million 
people living in Zambia still depend on farming for a major part of their livelihood (World Bank 
2018b). Of all employed Zambians, 53% worked in the agriculture sector in 2017 (World Bank 
2018b). Tobacco is a major agricultural crop in Zambia. The amount of land dedicated to tobacco 
farming increased by over 350% from 1993 to 2013 (Labonté et al. 2018). There are approximately 
54,000 Zambians living in tobacco farming households (Labonté et al. 2018). In terms of export 
value, tobacco is the third largest crop after maize and cotton (Goma et al. 2017). The vast majority 
of Zambian tobacco was exported to other countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, and South Africa 
(Drope 2011). The export volume increased significantly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (United 
Nations 2018). Recently, however, local farmers faced regional competition from other low-cost 
producers, including Zimbabwe (Labonté et al. 2019). Consequently, the export of raw tobacco 
fell from 50 thousand tonnes in 2004 to less than 30 thousand tonnes three years later and has 
remained relatively stable at 30 thousand tonnes since then (Figure 2.3) (United Nations 2018). 
Also recently, two cigarette manufacturing facilities opened in Zambia (Labonté et al. 2019). The 
opening of the new cigarette manufacturing plants may heighten the perceived economic 
importance of tobacco to the national economy as well as to several key local ones (Labonté et al. 
2019). 
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Figure 2.3 Volume of tobacco exported from Zambia 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
 
Put in perspective, however, tobacco’s contribution to the Zambian economy is not large. In the 
first place, agriculture in Zambia makes up a relatively small portion of the value added to the 
economy. The combination of agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed only 7% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 (World Bank 2018). Contrary to the common 
belief held by the government (Labonté 2004), many smallholder tobacco farmers across Zambia 
are losing money, with their costs outweighing their revenues (Drope 2011; Makoka et al. 2018). 
Although tobacco is portrayed by the industry and many government officials as a major export 
crop (Labonté et al. 2018), the crop’s contribution to the economy is modest. In 2017, the total 
value of tobacco exported from Zambia was 88.5 million USD, 1% of the total export value from 
the country (United Nations 2018). Tobacco product manufacturing is even more marginal in 
Zambia, with the number of people employed in leaf processing and trading estimated at less than 
5000 (Labonté et al. 2018). 
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There is also a large health and economic burden associated with tobacco use in Zambia. Estimates 
show that the number of tobacco-related deaths in Zambia increased from 3000 per year (43 per 
100,000) in 1990 to 8000 per year (46 per 100,000) in 2015 (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation 2016). Tobacco smoking is not only directly associated with numerous diseases, 
including lung cancer and cardiovascular disease, but also significantly worsens trajectories of 
other major health challenges such as tuberculosis and HIV infections. For example, tobacco 
smoking is connected to 8% of tuberculosis deaths in Zambia (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation 2016). Therefore, the societal costs of smoking include health care expenditures to treat 
tobacco-related diseases and productivity losses from morbidity and premature mortality. Other 
costs are associated with undernutrition and underinvestment in education in the tobacco-using 
households, as spending on tobacco products has been shown to divert resources from essential 
goods and services in Zambia (Chelwa and Van Walbeek 2014). There is also evidence suggesting 
that the crowding out of food purchases by tobacco purchases is more severe for poorer households 
(Chelwa and Van Walbeek 2014). 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Data Source 
Longitudinal data from two waves of the ITC Zambia Survey were used in this study. The surveys 
were conducted from September to December 2012 (Wave 1), and from August to October 2014 
(Wave 2). The ITC Zambia Survey is a nationally representative, face-to-face survey conducted 
on a longitudinal cohort sample of approximately 1,500 tobacco users and 600 non-users in each 
wave. This means that the respondents who took part in Wave 1 were contacted in Wave 2 to 
respond to a follow-up survey. For respondents that could not be reached, the sample was 
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replenished to maintain similar numbers of tobacco users and non-users. The retention rate for 
smokers was 61%, with respondents lost to attrition after Wave 1 being replenished from the same 
sampling frame at Wave 2 (ITC Project 2015).  
The sample of tobacco users and non-users for the ITC Zambia survey was selected through a 
multi-stage clustered sampling design. Specifically, a total of 150 clusters were allocated to all 
Zambian provinces, with the number of clusters allocated to each province being proportional to 
the population of that province. In each cluster, approximately 10 tobacco users and 4 non-users 
of tobacco were interviewed. Table 2.3 presents the demographic characteristics of the participants 
in the ITC Zambia survey. Additional methodological details for the survey can be found on the 
ITC Project website (ITC Project 2017).  
Because this study focuses on the impact of prices on cigarette use, survey responses for which 
the price of cigarettes could not be assigned were excluded from the study. As a result, the analysis 
was conducted on a sample of 2575 individuals (both smokers and non-smokers), of whom 1165 
appeared in both waves, yielding 3740 observations. 
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Table 2.3. Demographic characteristics of the ITC Zambia Wave 1 and 2 Survey respondents 
 Wave 1 (N=2,071) Wave 2 (N=2,009) 
 N % N % 
Gender 
Male  1,491  72.0  1,438  71.6 
Female  580  28.0  571  28.4 
Age Group     
15-17  53  2.6  43  2.1 
18-24  308  14.9  257  12.8 
25-39  820  39.6  778  38.7 
40-54  468  22.6  506  25.2 
55+  422  20.4  425  21.5 
Household Income 
Low  1,084  52.3  878  43.7 
Moderate  278  13.4  222  11.1 
High  421  20.3  712  35.4 
Non-response  288  13.9  197  9.8 
Education Level 
Low (illiterate/< primary)  295  14.2  293  14.6 
Moderate (some/completed primary)  1,039  50.2  997  49.6 
High (secondary or higher)  720  34.8  712  35.4 
Non-response  17  0.8  7  0.4 
Marital Status 
Married  1,335  65.2  1341  66.8 
Divorced or separated  137  6.7  142  7.1 
Widowed  146  7.1  162  8.1 
Single  427  20.9  362  18.0 
Non-response  1  0.1  2  0.1 
Residence in Lusaka 
Yes 359 17.3 355 17.7 
No 1,712 82.7 1,654 82.3 
Source: ITC Zambia National Report (ITC Project 2015) 
 
2.2.2. Measures 
To estimate the impact of cigarette prices on cigarette use in Zambia, the analysis involves 
modeling the probability of the discrete choice of whether an individual currently smokes. Because 
cigarette smoking is associated with significant health risks for even light smokers (1-4 cigarettes 
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per day) (Bjartveit and Tverdal 2005), in this study I focus on smoking status and not smoking 
intensity, as this is a clinically more meaningful measure. 
The primary explanatory variables in this analysis are the prices of FM and RYO cigarettes, as 
reported by the survey respondents. It is possible to derive self-reported cigarette prices from the 
ITC Zambia Survey in two ways. First, respondents reported the cost of their last cigarette or RYO 
tobacco purchase. Based on that self-reported cost and on the reported number of cigarettes or the 
amount of RYO tobacco purchased in their last purchase, I calculate the price per stick that they 
paid. 
The amount of loose tobacco for RYO cigarettes was reported either in grams or in various other 
quantities and container sizes (e.g. “4 tablespoons”). For responses that were not in grams, but 
where the amount of tobacco purchased was still identifiable, I converted the reported amount of 
tobacco into grams (Aqua-Calc 2017). Prices per gram of RYO cigarettes were then converted to 
price per RYO stick, using the conversion of 0.92 grams per stick from the US Master Settlement 
Agreement (United States Government Accountability Office 2012).  
While the first price measure was based on the sum of money spent during the last tobacco 
purchase, the second method derives the cigarette price from the reported sum of money spent on 
cigarettes in the last 30 days and the number of cigarettes smoked each day. These data also are 
used to generate the price per stick. The method assumes that, on average, cigarettes purchased in 
the last 30 days were also consumed in that period. This should be the case in Zambia, as about 
half of smokers purchased loose (single) cigarettes in 2014 (ITC Project 2015), which suggests 
that smokers do not stockpile. The ITC survey does not collect separate data on the number of FM 
and RYO cigarettes smoked per day, but rather collects information on the total number of 
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cigarettes smoked. Therefore, the spending-based price of FM and RYO could not be calculated 
for those who were dual users of FM and RYO (23% of smokers in the sample). 
Both price measures are subject to recall bias. As some values of the last-purchase price and the 
spending-based price were clearly misreported, I did not use prices that were outliers for both 
measures (±2 standard deviations from the survey wave mean). As well as being subject to a recall 
bias, the spending-based price measure can also be subject to underreporting bias, as people tend 
to underreport the number of cigarettes they smoke per day (Liber and Warner 2018). The value 
of the tobacco purchased might also be underreported. Therefore, when calculating both RYO and 
FM prices for each individual, I first used the self-reported price from the last purchase as the more 
reliable price, and used the spending-based price only if the last-purchase price was not available. 
I accounted for the redenomination of the Zambian kwacha that occurred in 2013, when the old 
currency unit was divided by 1000. The prices from the first wave were also adjusted for inflation, 
so that all prices used in the analysis are in 2014 kwacha. 
One obstacle to using self-reported prices for estimating the demand equations is that prices may 
be endogenous from the simultaneity of price and consumption. To address this problem, the prices 
of FM and RYO were (separately) averaged by geographical regions (primary sampling units, 
n=20) and by wave. These averaged prices were then assigned to both smokers and non-smokers 
in the given region and wave. This technique was used by Nargis et al. (2014)in their analysis of 
similar data from the ITC Bangladesh Survey. In one geographical region, no FM price was 
reported in either wave, while in another one, no RYO price was reported in wave two. In those 
instances, prices could not be assigned, and therefore those observations (n=284) were excluded 
from the study.  
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Another explanatory variable is respondents’ per capita household income. The analysis uses a 
survey-reported categorical variable for the income status of individuals in relation to the 
international poverty lines of $1.25 and $2.00 per person per day (United Nations 2009). Because 
12% of respondents did not report their income, I added the missing response as one of the 
categories. This was done to avoid dropping the responses from the model. As a result, the income 
variable includes four categories: income below $1.25 (reference group), income from $1.25 to 
$1.99, income at $2.00 and above, and income not reported. Other explanatory variables include 
participants’ age; a dummy variable for gender; a dummy variable for residence in an urban area; 
a dummy variable for residence in Lusaka; a categorical variable for educational attainment; a 
dummy variable for occupation in a white-collar job; and a dummy variable for self-reported health 
status as good/excellent. 
2.2.3. Analysis 
The analysis includes a model for current use of any cigarettes (FM and/or RYO), separate models 
for smoking status for FM and RYO, as well as a model for dual cigarette use (both FM and RYO). 
Random effects probit models in the following functional form were used to estimate the 
probability of cigarette smoking participation (Model 1), the probability of RYO and FM cigarette 
smoking participation (Models 2 and 3), and the probability of dual use (Model 4): 
Model 1, 2, 3 and 4: Pr(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1| 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡,  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖)
= Φ(𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖)  
In the above equation, current smoker is the current cigarette smoker (either FM or RYO), the 
current FM cigarette smoker, the current RYO cigarette smoker, and dual user of FM and RYO 
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cigarettes in Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution, while αi is the individual specific random effect. For individual i at 
time t, Price1 is the price of FM cigarettes and Price2 is the price of RYO cigarettes. Income is 
represented as the four-category dummy variables, while X represents other socioeconomic 
variables, such as age, gender, urban residence, residence in Lusaka, education, occupation, and 
health status variables. 
The use of random effects models is preferred over fixed effects models for two reasons:  
(a) the fixed effects models would lose observations for those respondents who appear only once 
in the panel (41% of observations); and (b) the fixed effects model would not allow for the 
identification of the effect of any variable with no within-individual variation (e.g. gender) or little 
within-individual variation (e.g. smoking status) over time.  
Many empirical studies based on the ITC data have used generalized estimating equations (GEE) 
(Thompson et al. 2006). The main difference between GEE and the random-effect models is that 
GEE produces population-averaged coefficients (what happens to the whole population if 
everyone’s predictor variable is increased by 1 unit) while the random effects models produce 
subject-specific coefficients (what happens to a single individual when the predictor is increased 
by 1 unit). Subject-specific coefficients are usually considered to be more accurate estimates of 
the underlying causal mechanism and, therefore, the random-effect models are preferred for this 
study over the GEE models. 
It might be unrealistic to assume that the error terms between Model 2 and Model 3 are 
uncorrelated, since the decisions to smoke RYO and FM cigarettes are most likely linked. This 
issue is addressed by estimating the bivariate probability of RYO and FM cigarette smoking 
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participation (simultaneous equations of Model 2 and Model 3) using a bivariate seemingly 
unrelated random effects probit (Model 5), where the error terms from the two models are allowed 
to be correlated: 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 5: 
Pr(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦-𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜋𝑖)
= Φ(𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜋𝑖)  
Pr(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑌𝑂 𝑐𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝜗𝑖)
= Φ(𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜗𝑖) 
2.3. Results 
Table 2.4 summarizes last-purchase and spending-based prices of FM and RYO cigarettes, as 
reported in the ITC Zambia Survey. In both waves, RYO prices were significantly lower than FM 
prices, but the difference declined over time. The average reported FM cigarette price was almost 
8 times higher than the RYO cigarette price in the first wave (t=42.36, p<0.001), but only about 4 
times higher in wave 2 (t=9.63 p<0.001). This price convergence occurred as a result of a large 
increase in RYO prices between waves (an increase by 129% in the RYO prices, t = -2.01, 
p=0.045), compared to only a moderate increase in inflation-adjusted FM prices (a 15% increase 
in the combined FM prices, t=-2.94, p=0.003). Finally, across waves and products, the spending-
based price was lower than the price based on the last purchase, possibly because the smokers 
underestimate the amount of money they spend on those products each month. 
For smokers of FM, there was a large variation in the reported price, depending on cigarette brand. 
In 2014, the average reported price varied from 0.35 kwacha (0.03 USD) per stick for the Pacific 
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brand to 0.70 kwacha (0.07 USD) per stick for the Pall Mall brand. Additionally, respondents 
reported paying more per stick when buying single cigarette sticks (0.65 kwacha or 0.06 USD per 
cigarette stick), compared to cigarette packs (0.48 kwacha or 0.05 USD per stick) and cartons (0.35 
kwacha or 0.03 USD per stick) in 2014. Finally, for those who reported buying cigarettes by the 
pack, both the spending-based price (10.2 kwacha per pack) and the price based on the last 
purchase (9.68 kwacha per pack) in 2014 were similar to cigarette prices reported by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit for Lusaka (9.00 kwacha for local-brand cigarettes and 11.00 kwacha for 
Marlboro cigarettes) (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). 
Table 2.4. Inflation-adjusted cigarette prices in Zambia in 2014 (kwacha per stick) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 1 and 
2 combined 
Between-
wave 
price 
change 
P-value*  
 mean n mean n mean n %  
Factory-made cigarettes 
Last-purchase price 0.54 640 0.62 571 0.58 1211 +15% 0.001 
Spending-based price 0.52 434 0.46 440 0.49 874 -12% 0.054 
Combined price 0.54 650 0.62 585 0.58 1235 +15% 0.003 
Roll-Your-Own cigarettes 
Last-purchase price 0.13 24 0.29 110 0.26 134 +123% 0.542 
Spending-based price 0.07 280 0.10 266 0.08 546 +43% 0.001 
Combined price 0.07 298 0.16 308 0.12 606 +129% 0.045 
*P-value for the between-wave mean-comparison test.   
   
 
Women and those who reported good or excellent health were significantly less likely to smoke in 
each model. Higher income was associated with a lower probability of smoking any cigarette type 
(either FM or RYO), a lower probability of RYO smoking, and a lower probability of dual use, 
but was unrelated to the probability of FM smoking. Older respondents were less likely to smoke 
FM and more likely to smoke RYO. On the other hand, urban residence and formal education were 
significantly associated with a higher probability of FM smoking and a lower probability of RYO 
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smoking. White-collar workers were also significantly less likely to smoke RYO. Finally, residents 
of the capital city, Lusaka, were more likely to smoke all types of cigarettes, but especially FM, 
than the rest of the respondents. With a lower probability of RYO smoking by more educated and 
wealthier individuals, it seems that RYO is regarded as an inferior product to FM cigarettes in 
Zambia. 
Table 2.5 summarizes the results from the five models of cigarette smoking participation in 
Zambia. The own-price effects for FM and RYO cigarettes on the likelihood of smoking are 
negative in all models, except for the model of the likelihood of dual use. The own-price effects 
are significant for both FM and RYO cigarettes in the model of any cigarette use (Model 1), and 
in models of RYO use (Models 3 and 5). Additionally, the own-price effects for FM are positive 
and significant in the model for dual use, which suggests that cigarette price increases lead to more 
dual use. There is also a positive relationship between RYO price and the likelihood of FM 
cigarette smoking (Models 2 and 5) and between FM prices and the likelihood of RYO smoking 
(Models 3 and 5). The cross-price coefficient is, however, significant only for the effect of the FM 
cigarette price on RYO smoking, which suggests that RYO cigarettes are substitutes for FM 
cigarettes.  
Women and those who reported good or excellent health were significantly less likely to smoke in 
each model. Higher income was associated with a lower probability of smoking any cigarette type 
(either FM or RYO), a lower probability of RYO smoking, and a lower probability of dual use, 
but was unrelated to the probability of FM smoking. Older respondents were less likely to smoke 
FM and more likely to smoke RYO. On the other hand, urban residence and formal education were 
significantly associated with a higher probability of FM smoking and a lower probability of RYO 
smoking. White-collar workers were also significantly less likely to smoke RYO. Finally, residents 
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of the capital city, Lusaka, were more likely to smoke all types of cigarettes, but especially FM, 
than the rest of the respondents. With a lower probability of RYO smoking by more educated and 
wealthier individuals, it seems that RYO is regarded as an inferior product to FM cigarettes in 
Zambia. 
Table 2.6 presents the own- and cross-price probability elasticities of prevalence for RYO and FM 
cigarettes based on these results. For FM prices, the estimated own-price elasticity of smoking 
prevalence (either FM or RYO cigarettes) is -0.20. For RYO prices, the estimated own-price 
elasticity of smoking prevalence is -0.02 or -0.03, depending on the model. The cross-price 
elasticities between FM prices and RYO use were 0.27 and 0.18 in Models 3 and 5, respectively.  
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Table 2.5. Results of probit analyses of the probability of cigarette smoking in Zambia  
Variables Random effects probit models 
Bivariate seemingly 
unrelated random 
effects probit 
 
All 
cigarette 
use:  
Model 1 
Factory-
made 
cigarettes 
use: 
 Model 2 
RYO 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 3 
Dual 
use: 
Model 4 
Factory-
made 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 5 
RYO 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 5 
Price of factory-
made cigarettes 
-1.00** -0.17 1.01** 1.06*** -0.30 0.91* 
Price of RYO 
cigarettes 
-0.73** 0.05 -0.41** 0.13 0.07 -0.42* 
Income status  
Below $1.25 
(reference) 
      
$1.25 to $1.99 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.12 
$2.00 and above -0.25* -0.02 -0.65*** -0.41*** 0.01 -0.67*** 
Not reported -0.35** -0.02 -0.32** -0.17 -0.01 -0.34* 
Age  0.001 -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.004* -0.03*** 0.02*** 
Gender  
Male (reference) 
      
Female -4.25*** -2.94*** -3.63*** -1.78*** -2.96*** -3.68*** 
Urban area of 
residence 
No (reference) 
      
Yes -0.01 0.95*** -2.07*** -0.78*** 0.95*** -2.06*** 
Residence in 
Lusaka 
No (reference) 
      
Yes 0.89*** 0.62*** -0.45** -0.02 0.64*** -0.44** 
Education 
Low education (ref.) 
      
Primary and higher -0.14 0.91*** -0.49*** 0.37*** 0.95*** -0.50*** 
Occupation 
Other than white 
collar (reference) 
      
White collar 0.03 0.21 -2.10*** -0.86* 0.22 -2.08*** 
Self-reported 
health status 
Poor and average 
(reference) 
      
Good and excellent -0.70*** -0.56*** -0.85*** -0.44*** -0.52*** -0.84*** 
Constant 6.67*** 2.30*** 5.59*** 1.16*** 2.32*** 5.67*** 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; number of observations: 2197 
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Table 2.6. The estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities of prevalence for factory-made 
and RYO cigarettes in Zambia 
 Random effects probit  
Bivariate seemingly 
unrelated random effects 
probit 
 
All 
cigarette 
use 
Factory-made 
cigarette use 
RYO 
cigarette 
use 
Factory-made 
cigarette use 
RYO 
cigarette 
use 
Factory-made 
cigarette price 
-0.20** -0.05 0.27** -0.14 0.18* 
RYO cigarette 
price 
-0.03** 0.004 -0.03** 0.01 -0.02* 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Elasticities are calculated using probabilities estimated at 
the mean of the covariates. 
 
The reason why the results from the separate probit models (Models 2 and 3) vary from those of 
the seemingly unrelated random effects probit model (Model 5) is the bias caused by the 
correlation of disturbance terms between the two equations for FM and RYO in Models 2 and 3, 
which is represented in the system of equations in Model 5. While the observation-specific 
disturbances (error terms) are uncorrelated in Model 5 (r=-0.05; 95% CI -0.23 to 0.14), there is a 
significant correlation between individual-specific disturbance terms (πi and ϑi) (r=0.29; 95% CI 
0.18 to 0.40), suggesting that, as expected, a person’s decision to smoke FM is related to their 
decision to smoke RYO. This implies that the system of equations approach of Model 5 was 
appropriate, and thus that the estimates arising from that approach are superior to those arising 
from the non-systems approach. 
2.3.1. Robustness check 
In this study, the prices of FM and RYO were averaged by geographical regions to address a 
potential problem of prices being endogenous. Such an approach, however, assumes that much of 
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the observed variation in prices takes place between geographical regions (primary sampling 
units), as opposed to within those regions. Therefore, in the robustness check, I performed an 
alternative analysis allowing prices to vary between individuals, rather than between regions. 
Specifically, I first regressed prices of FM and RYO on geographical regions and waves as well 
as household characteristics (income status, residence in an urban area, residence in the capital city 
of Lusaka) and form of tobacco purchased (single stick cigarettes, pack of cigarettes, carton of 
cigarettes, or hand-rolled tobacco). The models’ fitted values were then predicted for both smokers 
and nonsmokers and used as explanatory variables in models of smoking status.  
The results from the models that used fitted values of cigarette prices are presented in Table 2.7, 
while Table 2.8 presents elasticities calculated using those models. All cross-price effects are 
positive and significant in those models. The substitution effect from FM to RYO cigarette use in 
the event of increase in FM cigarette prices is stronger than the substitution from RYO to FM. 
Additionally, in those models, the own-price effects are also significant for FM use. 
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Table 2.7. Results of probit analyses predicting the probability of cigarette smoking in 
Zambia using fitted values of cigarette prices 
Variables Random effects probit models 
Bivariate seemingly 
unrelated random 
effects probit 
 
All 
cigarette 
use: 
Model 1 
Factory-
made 
cigarettes 
use: 
 Model 2 
RYO 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 3 
Dual 
use: 
Model 4 
Factory-
made 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 5 
RYO 
cigarettes 
use: 
Model 5 
Price of factory-
made cigarettes 
-1.65*** -1.40*** 3.98*** 2.00*** -1.54*** 3.66*** 
Price of RYO 
cigarettes 
-0.80*** 0.81*** -0.41 0.38 0.86*** -0.34 
Income status  
Below $1.25 
(reference) 
      
$1.25 to $1.99 0.18 0.16 -0.04 0.09 0.17 -0.0001 
$2.00 and above 0.17 0.16 -0.65*** -0.42*** 0.20 -0.59*** 
Not reported -0.16 0.16 -0.52*** -0.24* 0.18 -0.47** 
Age  0.01** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.002 -0.04*** 0.04*** 
Gender  
Male (ref.) 
      
Female -0.24 -0.12 -0.48 -0.50** -0.13 -0.36 
Urban area of 
residence 
No (ref.) 
      
Yes -0.22* 1.54*** -2.04*** -0.77*** 1.60*** -1.98*** 
Residence in 
Lusaka 
No (ref.) 
      
Yes 0.56*** 0.98*** -0.79*** -0.15 0.90*** -0.75*** 
Education 
Low education (ref.) 
      
Primary and higher 0.03 1.11*** -1.12*** 0.49*** 1.13*** -0.99*** 
Occupation 
Other than white 
collar (ref.) 
      
White collar 0.33 (omitted) -1.51** -0.69 (omitted) -1.48** 
Self-reported health 
status 
Poor and average 
(ref.) 
      
Good and excellent 0.40*** 0.15* -0.45*** -0.19** 0.12 -0.43*** 
Constant 2.67*** -0.21 1.12** -0.65* -0.07 1.02** 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; number of observations: 2197 
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Table 2.8. The estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities of prevalence for factory-made 
and RYO cigarettes in Zambia from models that use fitted values of cigarette prices 
 Random effects probit  Bivariate seemingly 
unrelated random 
effects probit 
 All cigarette use Factory-
made 
cigarette 
use 
RYO 
cigarette 
use 
Factory-
made 
cigarette 
use 
RYO 
cigarette 
use 
Factory-made 
cigarette price 
-0.19*** 
-0.47*** 2.05*** -0.50*** 2.88*** 
RYO cigarette 
price 
-0.02*** 
0.06*** -0.04 0.06*** -0.06 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Elasticities are calculated using probabilities estimated at 
the mean of the covariates. 
There are other areas of concern with this study. The first relates to the data set used in the 
estimation. The data set is a two-wave panel with a 39% attrition rate. This implies that, in the 
estimating sample, most individuals appear only once in the data. It is possible that attrition is 
correlated with smoking behavior. If that is the case, the replenishment sample might be different 
from the individuals who left the sample.  
To address this possibility, I checked that the differences in smoking behavior between those who 
left the sample after the first wave and those who joined in the second wave were not significant 
(p-value for Pearson χ2 test: 0.808), that is, that the replacement sample was similar in terms of 
smoking behavior to the individuals who left the sample. I also ran the models on the balanced 
sample only. The model of all cigarette use yielded price elasticity estimates that were similar to 
those obtained in the full-sample models: -0.28 for FM and -0.02 for RYO. Price effects were not 
significant in the models with the balanced sample. Results of probit analyses predicting the 
probability of cigarette smoking in Zambia on the balanced sample are presented in Table 2.9. 
These results suggest that the high survey attrition rate was not a problem in this analysis. 
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One other issue of concern is the large number of observations with a missing value for the income 
variable. Because 12% of respondents did not report their income, the missing response was one 
of the categories in the original models. As a robustness check, I used multiple imputation to 
estimate the missing income categories. The variable was multiply-imputed using the ordered 
logistic regression. The imputation method assumed that the missing data were missing at random. 
To impute variable, I utilized all covariates from the multivariable models. In another analysis, I 
removed observations with missing income information. Including the imputed income in the 
models and removing missing income observations did not change the results materially (see Table 
2.9). 
Another issue that warranted a robustness check in this study is the RYO cigarette-equivalence 
conversion rate. The relative price of RYO is dependent on the weight of a stick. I used the US 
Master Settlement Agreement for a conversion rate, but the question remains whether the habits 
of rolling a cigarette in Zambia are comparable to the US. As a robustness check, I also used an 
alternative conversion of 0.7 grams per stick (Silvano Gallus et al. 2014), but this did not change 
the results materially (see Table 2.9). 
Lastly, the decision not to use survey weights in the model estimation may present challenges. A 
thorough academic discussion of this issue is provided by Solon, Haider and Wooldridge in their 
2013 working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Solon, Haider, and 
Wooldridge 2013). In a nutshell, for descriptive analysis, the use of the weights is advisable and, 
most often, necessary. The weighting issue is more nuanced when estimating causal effects, such 
as in the analysis presented in this chapter. The purpose of weighting is often to reduce the 
heteroscedasticity so as to improve the precision of estimates. Another reason for applying weights 
is to correct for endogenous sampling, which can result from the purposeful overrepresentation of 
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some populations in the sample. There are instances in which the weighted models will yield less 
precise estimates. When the weighted and unweighted models yield similar results, it is generally 
indicative that the model specification is satisfactory (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2013). 
For the analysis presented in this chapter, both heteroscedasticity of the error terms and 
endogenous sampling might be an issue. The sampling could particularly be a problem, since the 
ITC Survey purposefully oversamples smokers. Unfortunately, the longitudinal weights in the ITC 
survey are available only for the balanced sample, which means that 39% of observations would 
be lost if the longitudinal weights were used. To address the potential issue of the sample weights 
not being used in the study, the Huber-White covariance estimator was first used to obtain robust 
standard errors. The estimates obtained were almost identical to those from the original models, 
suggesting that heteroscedasticity was not an issue in those models (see Table 2.9). Secondly, as 
suggested by Solon et al. (2013), I estimated the weighted models and compared the estimates of 
the weighted and unweighted models. However, since the use of the longitudinal weights would 
drop nearly 40% of my observations, I pooled all observations in one large cross-section sample 
and used simple probit models with cross-section ITC weights. The results of that estimation are 
presented in Table 2.9. The new results have, as expected, the same signs as previously, and all 
estimates that were significant in the original models are still significant in the weighted model, 
except for the FM cigarette price elasticity in the model for ‘all cigarette use’, which has the 
expected sign, but is no longer significant. Although the coefficient estimates in the weighted 
models are slightly different than those in the original models, the results are still within the same 
magnitude as the estimates from the original model. This, again, suggests that the absence of 
weighting in the original model was not a serious issue.  
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Table 2.9. The estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities of prevalence for factory-made 
and RYO cigarettes in Zambia: original vs. robustness check models 
 
Random effects probit  
 
All cigarette use 
Factory-made 
cigarette use 
RYO cigarette 
use 
Original Models 
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.20** -0.05 0.27** 
RYO cigarette price -0.03** 0.004 -0.03** 
Analyses on the balanced sample  
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.28** -0.04 -0.05 
RYO cigarette price -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 
Analyses with income categories imputed using multiple imputation 
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.21*** -0.07 0.20** 
RYO cigarette price -0.03** 0.01 -0.02** 
Analyses with missing income observations removed 
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.21** -0.15 0.25** 
RYO cigarette price -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02* 
Analyses using an alternative conversion from grams to sticks for RYO prices 
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.19** -0.06 0.28** 
RYO cigarette price -0.04*** 0.01 -0.03** 
Analyses with robust standard errors  
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.20** -0.05 0.28** 
RYO cigarette price -0.03*** 0.004 -0.03** 
Analyses using weighted cross-sectional approach 
Factory-made cigarette 
price 
-0.22 -0.15 0.46*** 
RYO cigarette price -0.05*** 0.01 -0.06*** 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
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2.4. Discussion 
This study finds that the higher prices for both FM and RYO cigarettes are significantly related to 
a reduced likelihood of smoking in Zambia. The estimated smoking prevalence elasticity for FM 
cigarettes is around -0.20. This means that a 10% increase in FM prices leads to a 2% relative 
reduction in smoking prevalence. This estimate is within the range usually observed in LMICs 
(between -0.10 and -0.40) (IARC 2011). The own-price elasticity of FM smoking prevalence was 
only significant in the models that used fitted values of cigarette prices, probably because there is 
more within-region than between-region variation in FM cigarette price. The significant estimated 
elasticity from the models that used fitted values of cigarette prices was -0.47, suggesting that a 
10% increase in FM prices leads to a 4.7% decline in FM use. Effects of this magnitude make 
cigarette price increases the most effective policy instrument to discourage smoking (IARC 2011). 
Thus, in Zambia, increasing the excise tax on cigarettes to drive price increases will be an effective 
tool for improving public health and reducing tobacco-related costs. 
As a party to the WHO FCTC (since 2008), Zambia has agreed to impose high cigarette taxes. 
Although the specific tax was raised from 90 to 200 kwacha per 1000 sticks in 2016 and from 200 
to 240 kwacha per 1000 sticks in 2017, the inflation-adjusted cigarette price has nevertheless 
dropped during that time (Figure 2.1).  
One of the reasons for low tobacco taxes in Zambia is that some sectors of the government have 
preferred to encourage tobacco production, processing, and manufacturing, highlighting a clear 
conflict between short-term economic goals and tobacco control commitments (Lencucha et al. 
2016). Reduced tobacco use would generate enormous long-term economic gains through higher 
productivity and decreased health costs. Therefore, in order to significantly increase cigarette 
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taxes, the Zambian Ministry of Health and civil society should actively engage in the formulation 
of new policies and demonstrate to finance officials that controlling tobacco use is in the long-
term best economic interests of the country. Fortunately, there is evidence of significant public 
support for higher cigarette taxes in the country, even among smokers themselves. Most 
respondents to the 2014 ITC Zambia Survey (78%), including nearly three-quarters of smokers 
(74%), thought that their government should increase taxes on cigarettes (ITC Project 2015). 
Future tobacco tax increases in Zambia must take into account both the country’s high inflation 
rates and rapid income growth.  
Another factor that must be considered in the drafting of new tax policies is the extensive use of 
RYO tobacco. Although the price for RYO increased substantially between the waves of the study, 
possibly influenced by a spike in the price of raw tobacco on the formal market (Tobacco Board 
of Zambia 2019), including in the price of exported tobacco (United Nations 2018), RYO remains 
much cheaper than FM cigarettes. The estimated value of smoking prevalence elasticity for RYO 
cigarettes is between -0.02 and -0.03. This suggests that a 10% increase in RYO prices leads to a 
0.2% - 0.3% relative reduction in smoking prevalence. These low elasticities might result from the 
very low RYO price. With RYO cigarettes being very inexpensive, marginal price changes do not 
lead to much change in quantities demanded, even with this product being predominantly smoked 
by the lowest-income group (ITC Project 2015). 
Positive cross-price elasticities between FM and RYO cigarettes found in this study suggest that 
these two products are substitutes. When the price of one of the products goes up, some smokers 
switch to using the other product. In the models, this cross-price effect is particularly significant 
for the impact of FM prices on RYO use. Estimates from most models suggest that a 10% increase 
in the FM cigarette price would lead to a 2% to 3% increase in RYO cigarette use prevalence, 
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although the estimates from the models that use fitted values of cigarette prices are much higher. 
The estimated value of the FM price elasticity of all-product smoking prevalence (-0.20) suggests 
that a 10% price increase for FM cigarettes would result in 2% reduction in smoking for all 
products, while the value of own-price elasticity of FM smoking prevalence (-0.47) suggests that 
a 10% price increase in FM cigarettes would result in 4.7% decline in FM cigarette use. This 
suggests that less than half of the effect of FM price increase is accounted for by smokers quitting 
smoking, and most of that effect is probably due to switching products. The cross-price effect for 
the impact of RYO prices on FM use was positive and significant in models that used fitted values 
of cigarette prices only (Table 2.8). That model suggests that a 10% increase in RYO price would 
result in a 0.6% increase in FM cigarette sales. The fact that in most models RYO tobacco is a 
substitute for FM cigarettes, when the price of FM cigarettes increases, but not the other way 
around, might again be resulting from the very low RYO prices. 
This switching behavior weakens the impact of tax increases intended to improve public health. 
As a remedy, both the WHO and the implementation guidelines for Article 6 of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) recommend taxing all tobacco 
products comparably in order to reduce the between-product price differences, thus dis-
incentivizing substitution (World Health Organization 2015b; WHO FCTC 2014). Zambia, 
however, already applies the same excise tax rates for RYO tobacco and FM cigarettes, although 
the extent of tax compliance for RYO is unknown. Therefore, instead of simply equalizing the tax 
rates between products, the between-product price differences must be reduced by other means.  
There are two potentially viable strategies to reduce the price differential between RYO and FM. 
First, the country could consider stronger measures to increase enforcement and enhance tax 
compliance on RYO. A good first step taken recently by Zambia is to extend the tax stamp system, 
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which is currently limited to cigarettes, to other excisable products. The project is scheduled to be 
rolled out in May 2019 (Mwanakatwe 2018). Implementing other measures could be difficult, 
because much of the RYO tobacco comes straight from the fields with minimal processing, using 
mostly traditional methods, with local market forces determining the price. A stricter control of 
the tobacco supply chain is needed through measures such as those listed in the Protocol to 
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (United Nations 2012). 
Secondly, the government should strongly consider backing away from promoting tobacco 
growing and processing. Although the government’s support for tobacco growing is intended to 
promote exports (Lencucha et al. 2016), it directly violates Zambia’s commitment to the WHO 
FCTC, and it seems that this policy has had serious unintended consequences: local farmers are 
now also supplying tobacco for local RYO (Personal communication with Dr. Fastone Goma). 
Thus, by increasing the supply of RYO, tobacco farming is contributing to the very problem that 
the Ministry of Health and the country’s commitment to the FCTC seek to address. 
Focusing on the problems arising from RYO will be particularly important because of the socio-
economic status of RYO users. This study finds that, unlike FM cigarettes, RYO use is associated 
with lower income and education, and with rural residence. Therefore, government policies aiming 
to decrease health inequalities in society and reduce the negative economic consequences of 
tobacco use experienced by the poor must incorporate approaches to reduce RYO use, including 
the tax/price approaches that are the focus of this chapter. 
Besides substituting with RYO, FM cigarette smokers in Zambia can avoid paying higher cigarette 
prices by trading down to cheaper brands of FM cigarettes. A previous study based on the 2014 
wave of the ITC Zambia Survey found that higher price was significantly associated with brand 
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switching (Salloum et al. 2015). The significant variation in in prices of FM cigarettes in Zambia 
allows smokers the opportunity to trade down to cheaper brands.  
The recent change in the excise tax structure to one that is based on high and uniform specific 
taxes should help to alleviate this problem, because it most likely will reduce the between-brand 
variation in cigarette prices (Shang et al. 2014). Under the previous tax system, which was based 
on an ad valorem tax with a specific floor, both economic FM cigarette brands and RYO tobacco 
were tax-advantaged over more expensive cigarette brands. Specifically, because the net-of-tax  
price of economy FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco was lower than the net-of-tax price of premium 
FM cigarettes, the ad valorem tax on lower-priced FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco was lower than 
the tax on premium FM cigarettes. Relying on a specific tax should mitigate the tax advantage held 
by economy FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco and close the price gap markedly. A specific tax 
system will, however, require frequent changes in the tax rates to adjust for inflation and income 
growth. Therefore, the best practice is to set the tax rates to increase automatically (World Health 
Organization 2010). The one advantage of the ad valorem system is that the value of the tax follows 
changes in cigarette prices. 
This study advances understanding about methods to estimate the demand for multiple tobacco 
products. There is a substantial literature in which the demand for each product is estimated 
separately (IARC 2011). This literature assumes that the decision processes pertaining to the 
choosing of two tobacco products are unrelated. In this chapter, I found that the assumptions of 
the standard methods were violated. Error terms between equations are correlated, suggesting that 
decisions to smoke FM and RYO cigarettes in Zambia are linked. In addition, the longitudinal 
design of the ITC Zambia Survey allowed me to make stronger conclusions about the causal 
relationships between prices and the use of the two tobacco products. This increased 
61 
 
methodological sophistication demonstrates the advantage of cohort studies like the ITC to 
facilitate less biased estimates of critically important parameters such as price elasticities and 
cross-price elasticities, relative to repeated cross-sectional designs.  
2.4.1. Limitations 
A limitation of this study is that the price measures used in the models are based on self-reported 
prices. While I addressed the endogeneity problem resulting from the simultaneity of price and 
consumption, I could not eliminate other issues with the data. First, both the last-purchase price 
and the spending-based price are subject to recall bias, while the spending-based price can also be 
subject to underreporting of the number of cigarettes smoked. It should be noted, however, that 
the longitudinal design allows for control of the individual-level unobservable characteristics, 
which should capture some of the respondents’ biases.  
Secondly, the two price measures represent slightly different prices: one is the last-purchase price, 
while the other represents the average purchase price for the last 30 days. Unfortunately, too, for 
some observations, the last-purchase price of RYO could not be calculated because the 
respondents’ verbal description of the amount of RYO purchased did not allow us to convert it to 
grams. For those observations, I had to rely on the spending-based price. Finally, the spending-
based price could not be calculated for dual users of FM and RYO, as the number of cigarettes 
smoked per day per cigarette type was not reported in the survey. Because each of the price 
measures had significant limitations, none could be used in the models independently. Combining 
the two measures is not ideal, because they are different. Nevertheless, the availability of two 
independent price measures allowed us to triangulate the results. In consequence, I was able to 
estimate price effects of both anticipated sign and magnitude. 
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Thirdly, the endogeneity of self-reported prices could pose some problems. Finally, the analysis 
presented in this chapter focusses on cigarettes only and might be missing substitution to some 
other product types. For example, while only 2% of all ITC Zambia survey respondents reported 
using smokeless tobacco in 2014 (ITC Project 2015), some of the current FM and RYO users 
might choose to switch to smokeless tobacco in the event the price of FM and RYO cigarettes 
increases relative to the smokeless tobacco price. Nevertheless, the results are robust, with the 
models on fitted values of cigarette prices yielding results that are of the same direction, and similar 
significance, though of a higher magnitude, compared to the models on the averaged prices. 
2.4.2. Study application 
The results presented in this chapter have already been used to advance tobacco control in Zambia. 
One of the advantages of this study is its applicability to the real issues that the Zambian 
government currently faces. Zambia is one of the countries where the economic and health policy 
issues in tobacco control are tightly linked and interrelated. Implementation of any new tobacco 
tax law would require coordinated efforts between many branches of the government. In particular, 
because of the availability of the cheap roll-your-own tobacco that comes straight from the tobacco 
farms, the tobacco tax reform would require coordination between the finance, trade, and 
agricultural branches of the government. This study links tobacco taxation and tobacco farming 
issues and, therefore, and serves a greater purpose by bringing those stakeholders together. 
Since its publication in 2018, the study presented in this chapter has been used by a joint mission 
of the WHO FCTC Secretariat and the United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP) in Zambia 
within the FCTC 2030 project. The aim of this project is to strengthen tobacco control in low- and 
middle-income countries in order to support governments in their efforts to accelerate the 
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implementation of the WHO FCTC. A key focus area of the FCTC 2030 project is direct support 
to fifteen low- and middle-income Parties to the FCTC, which have demonstrated the motivation 
to advance tobacco control. Zambia is one of the fifteen focus countries. As stated at the 
convention’s website: “This direct support is focused on the achievement of the general obligations 
and the time-bound measures of the Convention, strengthening tobacco taxation, implementing 
other articles of the WHO FCTC according to national priorities and promoting the implementation 
of the Convention as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (World Health 
Organization 2018). 
The mission, which included representatives from the University of Cape Town’s Knowledge Hub 
on Tobacco Taxation, UNDP, and the American Cancer Society, met with several key Zambian 
stakeholders in Lusaka in June 2018. During the first day of the engagement project meetings, 
representatives from the international organizations met with local key actors who are part of the 
process of drafting the new comprehensive tobacco legislation at the “Stakeholder Engagement on 
Proposal for New Comprehensive Tobacco Control Legislation” meeting organized by the 
International Legal Consortium (ILC). The local stakeholders included a Member of Parliament 
as well as officials from the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, Trade & Industry, Finance, 
Labour, the office of the Attorney General, the local government, the University of Zambia and 
civil society. Over four days, the mission representatives from international organizations met 
individually with officials from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Parliamentary Committees, Lusaka City Council, and the 
Tobacco Board of Zambia. There was also a separate, formal presentation at the Parliament to the 
chairs and co-chairs of all of the relevant parliamentary committees. 
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A fact sheet based on the study presented in this chapter was distributed at each of the FCTC 
Secretariat/UNDP FCTC-2030 Project Engagement meetings. The fact sheet presented the key 
results of the study in a comprehensible and compelling way. It translated the findings of the 
econometric models of the study into tools for policy change (see Figure 2.4). The price elasticities 
calculated in this study were also used to predict the results of proposed future tax increases over 
the next decade, not only in terms of declines in cigarette use, but also in terms of predicted 
increase in government revenue (see Figure 2.5). 
Figure 2.4. A graphic from a fact sheet used by the FCTC Secretariat/UNDP FCTC-2030 
Project Engagement presenting the results of the current study 
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Figure 2.5. Predicted effects of tobacco tax increases in Zambia based on price elasticities 
estimated in the current study 
 
As reported by members of the FCTC 2030 Project’s Zambia mission team, the presentation of the 
results of the study was appreciated and recognized by the Zambian stakeholders. For example, 
the representatives from the Ministry of Finance — particularly those from the excise tax 
department — were genuinely interested in the models showing revenue gain from increased 
tobacco taxation and have invited the team back to discuss the models. The study will keep playing 
an influential role in the efforts of the FCTC 2030 Project in upcoming months. 
2.5. Conclusions 
There is little evidence pertaining to price and cross-price elasticities for tobacco products. This is 
the first extensive study of price and cross-price elasticities for tobacco products in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and therefore significantly contributes to the limited global evidence from LMICs on the 
impact of tobacco product prices on between-product substitution.  
I used the longitudinal design of the ITC Zambia Survey, estimating a system of equations with 
panel data, a method which is superior to the standard estimation techniques. The longitudinal 
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study design enabled the determination of a temporal and causal relationship between price and 
the use of FM and RYO cigarettes. 
The findings of this chapter indicate that FM and RYO cigarettes are substitutes in Zambia, 
emphasizing the need for effective policies to reduce between-product price differences. Between-
product price differences undermine the effectiveness of tobacco tax policies. Further, consistent 
with the abundant evidence from high-income countries and a growing body of literature from 
LMICs, this study affirms that increasing taxes on and the price of cigarettes in Zambia can 
markedly reduce cigarette use. Increasing tobacco taxes, resulting in higher cigarette prices, not 
only improves public health and alleviates the detrimental effects of tobacco use, but also results 
in higher government revenue in developing economies that need the additional income. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE EFFECT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW 
NICOTINE PRODUCT ON CIGARETTE SALES – EVIDENCE OF DECLINE AND 
REPLACEMENT2 
3.1. Introduction 
Economists’ standard way of establishing between-product substitution is through product price. 
Therefore, in the analysis presented in the second chapter of this thesis, the factor affecting 
smokers’ switching was the price of the product. Specifically, I showed how changes in prices of 
two tobacco products, cigarettes and roll-your-own tobacco, affect demand for those products and 
make smokers switch from one product to the other. There are, however, instances when it is 
impossible to determine between-product substitution using this approach, either because 
calculating cross-price elasticities is not feasible, or there is no well-established market for which 
to calculate the elasticities. 
One obvious case of when calculating cross-price elasticities is not feasible is when the prices of 
the two goods are stable relative to inflation. With no variation in real price, over time and among 
the subjects, calculating cross-price elasticities is statistically not possible. In such cases, the price 
variable would either be treated as constant or simply dropped from a model. Whenever estimating 
cross-price elasticity is not feasible, product substitution cannot be determined using traditional 
economic means. 
                                                          
2 The data used in this chapter was purchased by the American Cancer Society Inc. from Intage Inc. (Intage’s Invoice 
number 80082575-S0101). This chapter is an updated and expanded version of a paper previously published in the 
Tobacco Control journal (Stoklosa, Cahn, et al. 2019). 
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Another instance in which traditional economic methods of establishing substitution might be 
difficult is when goods are freshly launched on the market, i.e. when the market is still developing. 
In such case, prices may play only a minor role in consumers’ behavior. For example, in the early 
stages of product market diffusion, the product is used by only a small group of consumers who 
are eager to try new ideas, seek for innovative products, and have relatively high incomes, allowing 
them to afford the risks associated with a high probability that the new, untested product will fail. 
In the marketing literature, those customers are referred to as innovators and early adopters (Rogers 
2003). There might be also issues with supply shortages for the new product. In the absence of a 
fully-developed, equilibrated market, the estimated cross-price elasticities for those groups of 
consumers might not be reflective of the preferences of the entire population. 
Issues concerning the methods that are used to determine whether two products are substitutes 
could apply to some products on the tobacco market. Specifically, estimating cross-price 
elasticities might be difficult for novel tobacco products. Recently, the introduction of different 
types of novel tobacco products is shifting the composition of the tobacco and nicotine market, 
markedly in some places. While many studies and reports observe changes in use for different 
tobacco product classes, rigorous studies of the exact substitution patterns between novel nicotine 
products and traditional tobacco products are hard to find, precisely for the reasons discussed 
above: the market for these products is still new and not fully equilibrated (e.g. because of the 
supply shortages), and there may not be enough variation in the prices of those products over the 
relatively short period of the products’ existence on the market. Therefore, analyses of substitution 
between traditional, combustible tobacco products and novel tobacco products are rare. Such 
analyses could help policymakers comprehensively evaluate the impact of novel products at a time 
when there is considerable uncertainty about how to regulate such products. 
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Heated tobacco products (HTPs) are one of the latest in a line of products that tobacco companies 
market as less harmful than regular cigarettes. Unlike cigarettes, which burn tobacco leaves, HTPs 
heat a processed tobacco leaf substance to a high temperature, slightly short of combustion. Unlike 
e-cigarettes, which aerosolize a liquid containing varying amounts of nicotine (or no nicotine at 
all), HTPs release the nicotine directly from tobacco leaf. The products have begun to show 
substantial sales growth in several countries where they have been introduced. Available in at least 
44 countries, as of the first quarter of 2019 (Philip Morris International 2019a), growth has been 
especially strong in Japan and Korea (Tabuchi et al. 2018; Kim et al. 2018). The global HTP market 
leader is IQOS from Philip Morris International (PMI), which, the company claims, generates a 
significantly lower quantity of “harmful or potentially harmful chemicals” than combustible 
cigarettes (Philip Morris Japan K.K. 2015). The product consists of short cigarette-like heated 
tobacco units (PMI’s Heatsticks) and a battery-powered device into which the Heatsticks are 
inserted (Figure 3.1). According to the manufacturer, one Heatstick lasts about six minutes or 14 
puffs, which is comparable to smoking one regular cigarette (Philip Morris International 2019c). 
Like regular cigarettes, Heatsticks consist of tobacco and a filter section (Philip Morris 
International 2019c). Some IQOS models offer Internet connectivity, which might potentially 
allow the manufacturer to customise the nicotine delivery by monitoring usage patterns and 
adjusting the dose (Lasseter et al. 2018). PMI predicts that by 2025 their “reduced-risk” category, 
which could be led by HTPs, will account for over 30% of the company’s sales volume and over 
38% of the company’s total net revenues globally (Philip Morris International 2018a). In New 
Zealand, PMI announced that it planned to switch its attention from cigarettes to IQOS and that it 
foresaw abandoning cigarette sales altogether (TVNZ 2019), though the credibility of these claims 
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is uncertain, particularly because of PMI’s longstanding and nearly complete reliance on 
combustible tobacco products as the core of its business. 
Figure 3.1. The IQOS of Philip Morris International 
 
Source: SimonDes / Philip Morris International [This file is licensed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license]. Notes: Letters A, B, and C as well as the legend 
were added to the original image by the author of this dissertation. Some IQOS products combine 
the holder and the charger. 
One of the main promises made by PMI is that IQOS is intended to displace sales of regular 
cigarettes. In numerous statements, the company asserts that IQOS is a “unique alternative to 
smoking combustible cigarettes for adult smokers” (Philip Morris Japan K.K. 2015) and that the 
goal of the product is “to switch hundreds of millions of adult smokers to less harmful alternatives 
than continued smoking as quickly as possible” (Philip Morris International 2018b). It is often 
presumed that the introduction and growth of IQOS would lead to declines in cigarette sales, but 
there is, so far, little empirical evidence supporting this assumption. However, in Japan, HTP sales 
Legend: 
A – charger 
B – holder 
C - heated tobacco unit 
(called HEETS or HeatSticks) 
A B C 
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have grown to the point where they now constitute a substantial share of the overall tobacco and 
“vapor” product (e.g., e-cigarettes) market – 17.1% according to trade sources (Lavery and Kratky 
2019) – outpacing the combined HTP and vapor-product sales in any other market in terms of total 
value by late 2018 (Euromonitor 2018).  
The study presented in this chapter aims to answer the question of whether the newly-introduced 
IQOS product significantly affects the cigarette market in a large economy. The study attempts to 
determine product substitutability in circumstances when calculating cross-price elasticities is not 
possible. It utilizes a natural experiment in IQOS availability created during a rollout of IQOS in 
2015 and 2016. PMI first introduced IQOS to twelve Japanese prefectures (a large political and 
geographical unit) in September 2015, ahead of their nationwide launch in April 2016. This 
staggered rollout created exogenous variation in the availability of IQOS across regions that can 
be used to assess whether IQOS introduction had a causal impact on tobacco cigarette sales. 
Specifically, using 2014-2018 monthly retailer panel data from Japan, the study analyses whether 
different dates of IQOS introduction across Japan’s regions are reflected in the patterns of cigarette 
sales in those regions. A series of placebo models are estimated to test if events other than IQOS 
introduction could better explain the observed trends in cigarette sales. Unlike the study presented 
in the preceding chapter, this study looks at product switching behaviors regardless of the product 
price. 
3.1.1. Tobacco use in Japan 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Japan had one of the highest tobacco smoking rates in the world 
(Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2017). The rate dropped substantially throughout the 
2000s and 2010s, but is still above the world’s average (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
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2017). The daily tobacco smoking rate among people aged ≥ 15 years was estimated at 16.9% 
(27% among men and 7.5% among women) in 2016 (World Health Organization 2018). 
Consequently, there are still 22 million current tobacco smokers in Japan, of which 19 million are 
daily tobacco smokers (World Health Organization 2018). Smoking rates are also substantially 
affected by socioeconomic status and place of residence. Having lower income and living in a non-
urban area are both associated with significantly higher rates of smoking (Fukuda, Nakamura, and 
Takano 2005).  
The drop in cigarette use during the early twenty-first century can only to small extent be attributed 
to Japan’s tobacco control policies, because tobacco control laws are not strongly implemented in 
the country. Most existing regulations are voluntary industry self-regulation (Katanoda et al. 
2014). With complete absence of national-level smoke-free policies, no tobacco advertising bans, 
no mass-media anti-tobacco campaigns, and only small health warnings on cigarette packs, Japan 
is significantly lagging behind in its implementation of tobacco control policies (World Health 
Organization 2017). The one relatively well-implemented tobacco control policy in Japan is its 
tobacco cessation policy, which makes the treatment of tobacco dependence widely available. In 
particular, the implementation of the 2002 Health Promotion Law was followed by the introduction 
of nicotine replacement therapy into the national insurance scheme, which substantially reduced 
costs for those seeking help with smoking cessation (Wada, Higuchi, and Smith 2016). 
Consequently, Japan’s smoking cessation programs are now ranked among the best in the region 
(World Health Organization 2017). 
Cigarette price is another factor that could potentially have affected smoking rates in Japan. 
Several studies on data from Japan show that higher cigarette prices lead to lower cigarette 
consumption (Luo, Abdel-Ghany, and Ogawa 2003) and lower smoking prevalence (Yuda 2013) 
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in the country. However, over the last seven years cigarette prices in Japan have not changed very 
much. Figure 3.2 shows the price of Marlboro cigarettes collected from stores in Tokyo between 
1990 and 2018. During the period covered by the graph, there has been only one large cigarette 
price hike in October 2010, when the specific cigarette excise tax was increased by 3.5 yen per 
cigarette, that is by 70 yen per pack (Yuda 2013). That 2010 tax hike that led to significantly higher 
cigarette prices resulted in a significant increase in cessation rates in the country (Tanihara and 
Momose 2015; Tabuchi et al. 2016). Other than that one large tax increase, there have been only 
a few minor tax increases (by 1 yen per cigarette). The prices are also relatively low compared to 
other countries. In 2016, the price of the most-sold cigarette brand in Japan (I$4.30), adjusted for 
purchasing-power parity, was not only much lower than the average price in a high-income country 
(I$7.19), but also lower than the average global cigarette price (I$4.87) (World Health 
Organization 2017). 
Figure 3.2. Price of Marlboro cigarettes in Tokyo, Japan 
Note: Price of Marlboro cigarettes (pack of 20; mid-priced store) from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019); inflation from the International Monetary Fund 
(International Monetary Fund 2019). 
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According to the Global Burden of Disease estimates, there are still more 200 000 tobacco 
smoking-related deaths and more than 17 000 second-hand smoking-related deaths in Japan each 
year (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2018). Therefore, reducing cigarette use in Japan 
would yield substantial benefits in terms of the number of premature deaths averted. 
3.1.2. Methodological background 
A considerable amount of the economic and marketing research has been directed at studying the 
demand for soon-to-be-introduced or newly-introduced products. The markets researched vary 
from new vehicle technologies (Mau et al. 2008) to rural landscape improvements (Campbell 
2007). These studies focus on understanding consumers’ preferences, which should reflect their 
future purchasing behaviors, and are used to predict the demand for new products on the market. 
Such information is critical for both existing firms and for entrepreneurs, whether they plan to 
launch a new product, add a new product category, extend an existing product line, or introduce 
an existing product to a new market. The studies help firms to forecast the future stream of revenue 
in order to inform their business plans and design better marketing and sales strategies.  
Much of this research that is focused on the impact of the introduction of a new product on the 
demand for existing products involves modelling the product demand using the product price as 
the primary independent variable. For example, a frequently-cited paper by Hausman and Leonard 
focusses on estimating the competitive effects of a new Kleenex Bath Tissue product introduction 
(Hausman and Leonard 2002). The authors estimated the price reduction for existing products as 
a result of the new product introduction (price effect) and used a demand system to estimate 
product own- and cross-price elasticities. Similarly to the analysis presented in this chapter, the 
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paper by Hausman and Leonard used shop scanner data from before and after the new product was 
introduced to estimate the effect of the new product introduction on the existing product market. 
However, as I demonstrate later in this chapter, the approach used by Hausman and Leonard could 
not be utilized in the analysis of IQOS heated tobacco product introduction in Japan because there 
was practically no variation in the price variable in the Japanese data. Specifically: 1) the price of 
the old product (regular cigarettes) did not change after IQOS introduction, 2) prices for IQOS and 
regular cigarettes were practically the same, 3) prices for both products did not change throughout 
the time of this analysis, and 4) prices of the products did not differ across the regions of Japan.  
Not being able to perform the analysis using product price data to estimate products cross-price 
elasticities, I used instead a relatively new method in the branch of causal inference: regression 
kink design. The method, first devised by Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (2010), is nested within 
the larger field of regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods. It is being increasingly used to 
assess the impact of treatment (such as a new policy implementation) on different outcome 
variables. The main problem with estimating the causal effects of many treatments is the 
endogeneity associated with how those treatments were assigned. For example, with scholarships 
being awarded to only the best students, it is hard to estimate an effect of the scholarship on the 
students’ future performance, since the well-performing students might have performed equally 
well, even in the absence of the scholarship. The RDD assesses whether there was a discontinuous 
change in the slope of the outcome of interest at the exact location of the treatment threshold (Card 
et al. 2016). In the student scholarship example, the RDD would compare the future performance 
of scholarship-receiving students who were just above the grade threshold to receive the 
scholarship to the future performance of students who were just below the threshold and, therefore, 
did not receive the scholarship. If a scholarship had no effect on the students’ performance, the 
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future performance of the two groups of students should be similar, since both groups had similar 
grades before the scholarship was awarded. However, if the scholarship substantially impacts the 
future performance of the recipients, the relationship between students’ grades before the 
scholarship was awarded and their performance after the scholarship was awarded would be 
discontinuous at around the grade threshold of the scholarship. 
Similarly, endogeneity problems might affect the relationship between cigarette use and novel 
tobacco use. Specifically, smokers who reduce their cigarette use by taking up novel tobacco 
products might have reduced their cigarette use had the novel tobacco products never been 
introduced. If a specific group of smokers were seeking to reduce their tobacco use and, therefore, 
took up novel tobacco products, those smokers might have reduced their cigarette use anyway, 
even in the absence of those products. The relationship between cigarette sales and IQOS 
introduction can be analysed with RDD methods. Using the regression kink design method, I 
conducted a series of analyses of the the relationship between the trends in cigarette sales (outcome 
variable) and the time of IQOS introduction (treatment variable).  
3.2. Methods  
3.2.1. Data  
Data on cigarette and heated tobacco unit sales were obtained from Intage Inc., a market research 
company based in Japan. The company collects data on sales of tobacco products from 
participating supermarkets and convenience stores and provides tobacco market size estimates for 
eleven of Japan’s twelve geographical regions, covering 99% of the population (Okinawa 
prefecture is the only region excluded from the company’s retailer panel for tobacco products). 
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The obtained data cover the period from September 2014 to August 2018. The total number of 
observations in this study is 528 (11 regions x 48 months). 
The Intage retailer panel data are aggregate monthly data on the number and value of items sold. 
While the data on cigarettes reflect sales of all cigarette brands combined, the HTP data include 
separate data for PMI’s IQOS. These data contain detailed information on the heated tobacco units 
only (PMI’s Heatsticks) and do not include information on the battery-powered devices (such as 
the PMI’s IQOS holder) into which the Heatsticks are inserted.  
To construct per capita cigarette sales and per capita heat sticks sales, I use information on the 
total population3 by prefecture obtained from the Japan Statistical Office (e-Stat 2018). The 
prefecture-level data were reduced into the eleven regions in the Intage data. Because the Statistical 
Office provides population estimates as of the 1st of October each year, the data for the other 
months were imputed using linear interpolation.  
3.2.2. Primary independent variable   
The primary exogenous variable is derived from PMI’s timeline of IQOS introduction to the 
Japanese market, drawn from PMI’s documents (Philip Morris Japan K.K. 2015). PMI started 
testing the product in selected stores in the city of Nagoya in November 2014 (Tabuchi et al. 2018; 
Philip Morris Japan K.K. 2015). The product was then introduced to the market in two phases: the 
first twelve prefectures in September 2015 (treatment group), and the remaining thirty-five 
                                                          
3 Total population was used, because the population data by age group by province were not available for the period 
of this analysis. 
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prefectures in April 2016 (control group) (Tabuchi et al. 2018; Philip Morris Japan K.K. 2015). 
Table 3.1 presents the months of IQOS introduction by prefecture. 
The Intage data used in this study include regions that are generally larger than a single prefecture. 
Therefore, I used three approaches to assign the introduction date to each of the Intage regions. In 
the first approach, I weighted the prefecture-level introduction date by the prefecture’s population. 
Specifically, in regions where most residents lived in prefectures with a September 2015 IQOS 
introduction, the assigned market introduction date was September 2015. Otherwise, the assigned 
market introduction date was April 2016. In the second approach, the regions that were not fully 
covered by IQOS rollout in September 2015 were assigned an April 2016 introduction date. 
Finally, in the third approach, I removed the regions with a partial September 2015 introduction 
from the analysis, leaving only the regions with a full September 2015 introduction and a full April 
2016 introduction. Table 3.1 lists introduction dates by region in all three approaches. 
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Table 3.1. IQOS introduction by region 
Prefecture 
IQOS 
introduced 
in the 
prefecture 
Share of 
region’s 
total 
population 
Region 
Percentage 
of region's 
population 
with early 
(Sept-15) 
IQOS 
introduction 
IQOS introduced 
in the region 
 
Approach 
1 
Approach 
2 
Approach 
3 
Hiroshima Sep-15 38% 
Chugoku 38% Apr-16 Apr-16 - 
Okayama Apr-16 26% 
Shimane Apr-16 9% 
Tottori Apr-16 8% 
Yamaguchi Apr-16 19% 
Hokkaido Sep-15 100% Hokkaido 100% Sep-15 Sep-15 Sep-15 
Fukui Apr-16 26% 
Hokuriku 0% Apr-16 Apr-16 Apr-16 Ishikawa Apr-16 38% 
Toyama Apr-16 35% 
Gumma Apr-16 26% 
Kanto 0% Apr-16 Apr-16 Apr-16 
Ibaraki Apr-16 38% 
Tochigi Apr-16 26% 
Yamanashi Apr-16 11% 
Chiba Sep-15 17% 
Keihin 100% Sep-15 Sep-15 Sep-15 
Kanagawa Sep-15 25% 
Saitama Sep-15 20% 
Tokyo Sep-15 38% 
Hyogo Sep-15 27% 
Kinki 82% Sep-15 Apr-16 - 
Kyoto Sep-15 13% 
Nara Apr-16 7% 
Osaka Sep-15 43% 
Shiga Apr-16 7% 
Wakayama Apr-16 5% 
Fukuoka Sep-15 39% 
Kyushu 39% Apr-16 Apr-16 - 
Kagoshima Apr-16 13% 
Kumamoto Apr-16 14% 
Miyazaki Apr-16 8% 
Nagasaki Apr-16 11% 
Oita Apr-16 9% 
Saga Apr-16 6% 
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Prefecture 
IQOS 
introduced 
in the 
prefecture 
Share of 
region’s 
total 
population 
Region 
Percentage 
of region's 
population 
with early 
(Sept-15) 
IQOS 
introduction 
IQOS introduced 
in the region 
 
Approach 
1 
Approach 
2 
Approach 
3 
Ehime Apr-16 36% 
Shikoku 0% Apr-16 Apr-16 Apr-16 
Kagawa Apr-16 25% 
Kochi Apr-16 19% 
Tokushima Apr-16 20% 
Nagano Apr-16 48% 
Shinetsu 0% Apr-16 Apr-16 Apr-16 
Niigata Apr-16 52% 
Akita Apr-16 11% 
Tohoku 26% Apr-16 Apr-16 - 
Aomori Apr-16 15% 
Fukushima Apr-16 21% 
Iwate Apr-16 14% 
Miyagi Sep-15 26% 
Yamagata Apr-16 12% 
Aichi 
Nov-14 - 
Nagoya 
city only  
50% 
  
Tokai 50% Sep-15 Apr-16 - 
Sep-15 – 
entire 
prefecture 
Gifu Apr-16 13% 
Mie Apr-16 12% 
Shizuoka Apr-16 25% 
 
3.2.3. Statistical method 
Linear trends were fitted to the per capita cigarette sales by each region using a fixed effects model. 
The regional fixed effects control for different initial levels of cigarette sales in the regions, which 
result from such factors as the social acceptability of cigarette use or the level of implementation 
of tobacco control regulations. If a link between IQOS and regular cigarette use exists, the event 
of IQOS market introduction will be reflected in the patterns of cigarette use. I used the “changing 
growth” time-trend model (Perron 1989) and Chow test (Chow 1960) to examine whether cigarette 
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sales followed the same trends before and after IQOS introduction in Japan. The null hypothesis 
in the test is that the trend in per capita cigarette sales remained stable over time. The alternative 
hypothesis is that there was a structural break in the trends with the IQOS heated tobacco product 
introduction in each region, i.e. that the trend lines were demonstrably kinked in the months after 
IQOS introduction. The “changing growth” model adapted for this study has the following 
functional form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽1𝑡 + (𝛽2 − 𝛽1)𝐷𝑇𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡 
where DTit
*=t-TBi, if t>TBi and 0 otherwise (Perron 1989); t refers to the time (month) and TBi 
refers to the time of break in region i (e.g. for regions with IQOS introduction in September 2015 
the TBi=13, as September 2015 was the thirteenth month in the dataset). The αi is the regional fixed 
effect. β1 - β2 represents the change in trend. The Chow test, in this instance, examines whether β1 
is statistically different from β2. 
Even if the Chow test finds that the trends in cigarette sales in Japan were not stable over time, 
this change in trends could have been caused by factors other than the introduction of the IQOS 
heated tobacco product. To check for that possibility, I devised a series of placebo tests to examine 
rigorously the likelihood that the observed relationship between IQOS introduction and cigarette 
sales decline could be attributed to 1) national-level factors coinciding with IQOS introduction, or 
2) random chance. 
First, I note that a structural break in trends in cigarette sales could have been caused by a national-
level factor that affected trends in cigarette sales across all regions at once. Such a factor could 
include a sudden downturn in the economy, an introduction of a national-level tobacco control 
law, or a large-scale natural disaster, or any other exogenous shock. To test for this possibility, I 
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estimated a set of placebo models explaining cigarette sales by a linear trend, each model with a 
kink for a different month of my analysis. I then compare the models’ ordinary R2 to those for the 
true model in which the sales trend lines are kinked in the actual months of IQOS introduction. 
To gain confidence that the association between IQOS introduction and cigarette sales decline is 
not the result of chance, I also employed an exact permutation test. The set of actual observed 
IQOS introduction times was repeatedly redistributed so that one or more regions were assigned 
the IQOS introduction date that was originally associated with a different region. The time-trend 
model with the new combination of the introduction dates was then estimated and the R2 recorded. 
This procedure was repeated for all 330 possible unique groupings of the true, original introduction 
dates in approach one (11!/(4!(11-4)!)=330), for all 55 possible combinations in approach two 
(11!/(2!(11-2)!)=55), and for all 15 possible combinations in approach three (6!/(2!(6-2)!)=15). 
This reassignment process allowed for the creation of a null distribution of R2 values, each 
associated with a different reassignment of introduction dates. Under the null hypothesis that the 
timing of each region’s decline in cigarette sales was unrelated to IQOS introduction, the R2 value 
of the true introduction dates would represent a random draw from this null distribution. The 
placement of the model based on the actual dates of IQOS introduction within this distribution – 
i.e. the ranking of the R2 for the introduction date model among those of the placebo permutation 
models – allows us to infer a p-value representing the probability that an association at least as 
strong as the one actually observed would have occurred due to random chance.  
An introduction date model and placebo models were estimated using each of the three approaches 
to assign an IQOS introduction date to the regions where IQOS was only partially introduced in 
September of 2015.  
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3.3. Results 
Per capita cigarette sales started to decline around the time of IQOS introduction (Figure 3.3). The 
patterns of cigarette use could not be affected by the pricing of the products, since IQOS and 
cigarette prices did not differ across regions during this period. According to the Intage data, the 
IQOS price remained stable at 21 yen per Heatstick across all regions and throughout the analysis. 
The weighted average cigarette price also remained stable at 20 yen per stick. Therefore, with no 
variation in the price variable, the standard, economic analysis of product substitution was not 
possible. 
Figure 3.3. Per capita cigarette sales in regions with earlier vs. in regions with later IQOS 
introduction 
 
Note: The black dashed vertical line indicates September 2015 IQOS introduction, while the blue dashed 
vertical line indicates April 2016 IQOS introduction.    
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The trend lines for per capita cigarette sales were kinked at the time of introduction of IQOS heated 
tobacco products in each of the eleven Japanese regions (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4 through Figure 
3.6). With high values of the Chow test statistics, the null hypothesis of the stability of the trend is 
rejected (F= 254.94, P<0.001 for approach one; F= 243.27, P<0.001 for approach two; F= 120.99, 
P<0.001 for approach three). Estimates from the test’s underlying model indicate that, across all 
regions, per capita cigarette sales were slightly increasing before the introduction of IQOS (at a 
rate of 0.10 to 0.14 cigarettes per person per month on average, depending on the approach) but 
started to decline after the IQOS introduction (declining at a rate of 0.78-0.14=0.64 to 0.77-
0.10=0.66 cigarettes per person per month, depending on the approach). Results from the models 
using the first, second, and third approach to define IQOS regional introduction dates are presented 
in Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6, respectively. 
Table 3.2 Relationship between IQOS introduction and cigarette sales in Japan: a changing 
growth approach 
 Coefficient estimates 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Time trend 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.10** 
Change in trend -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.77*** 
Constant 84.17*** 84.37*** 86.44*** 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; 
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Figure 3.4. Per capita cigarette sales and the model fitted values (Approach 1) 
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Figure 3.5. Per capita cigarette sales and the model fitted values (Approach 2) 
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Figure 3.6. Per capita cigarette sales and the model fitted values (Approach 3) 
 
The value of the R2 statistic indicates that the true model with region-specific kinks at IQOS 
introduction fits the trends in cigarette sales in Japan better than any of the placebo models with 
month-specific kinks that are applied uniformly across all regions. From this result, we can 
conclude that regional IQOS introduction dates explain the timing of the decline in cigarette sales 
better than any national-level event, including the IQOS national rollout in April 2016. 
The model based on the actual dates of introduction ranked in the top 98.5% (5th out of 330) of 
all possible placebo models with combinations of the original IQOS introduction months 
redistributed among regions in approach one. The model based on the actual dates of IQOS 
introduction also ranked in the top 92.7% (4th out of 55) of all possible placebo models in approach 
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two, and in the top 86.7% (2nd out of 15) possible models in approach three. Table 3.3 presents 
the goodness of fit of the true introduction date models versus the placebo permutation models in 
each approach.  
Table 3.3. Goodness of fit of the model using true IQOS introduction months vs. placebo 
models 
Approach 
True 
Model 
R2 
Simultaneous National-Level Placebo Date Models 
 – R2 distribution 
Months 
Tested 
Mean R2 Top 10% Top 5% Max 
1 0.7504 47 0.6898 0.7416 0.7434 0.7456 
2 0.7466 47 0.6898 0.7416 0.7434 0.7456 
3 0.7452 47 0.6910 0.7391 0.7424 0.7449 
                  
                  
Approach 
True 
Model 
R2 
Exact Permutation Test: True Model and Placebo Dates – R2 distribution 
True 
Model 
Rank 
Permutation 
Count 
Significance 
Level 
Mean 
R2 
Top 
10% 
Top 
5% 
Max 
1 0.7504 5 330 1.5% 0.7219 0.7393 0.7440 0.7594 
2 0.7466 4 55 7.3% 0.7290 0.7432 0.7479 0.7514 
3 0.7452 2 15 13.3% 0.7230 0.7452 0.7486 0.7486 
Note: For the simultaneous national-level placebo dates, n=47 (fourth-eight months in the dataset minus 
the first month). The larger the R2 value the better the model fits. Ordering the models by the Akaike’s and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) yielded the same results. 
 
Figure 3.7 through Figure 3.9 present the histogram of the R2 statistic for the placebo models in 
approaches one, two, and three, respectively, showing the placement of the test statistic for the true 
introduction date model amidst the null distributions. The results of this randomization test indicate 
that it is unlikely that the timing of the observed declines in cigarette sales are unrelated to IQOS 
introduction. 
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Figure 3.7. Distribution of R2 values associated with all possible reassignments of IQOS 
introduction dates among regions (Approach 1) 
 
Note: The black dashed vertical line indicates r-squared of the true, original model in Approach 1 
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Figure 3.8. Distribution of R2 values associated with all possible reassignments of IQOS 
introduction dates among regions (Approach 2) 
 
Note: The black dashed vertical line indicates r-squared of the true, original model in Approach 2 
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Figure 3.9. Distribution of R2 values associated with all possible reassignments of IQOS 
introduction dates among regions (Approach 3) 
 
Note: The black dashed vertical line indicates r-squared of the true, original model in Approach 3 
 
 
3.3.1. Robustness check 
I performed several additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings presented above. 
Although the lack of variation in the price between the products, across the regions, and over the 
time period suggests that the observed changes in cigarettes sales cannot be explained by the 
product price, there are still other variables that economists typically use to model product demand. 
Economic models of product demand usually control for consumers’ income. Additionally, 
because the data used in this analysis seems to fluctuate substantially on a monthly basis (Figure 
3.3), it seems reasonable for the models to control for seasonality in the data. Therefore, in another 
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set of models, I controlled for both income and seasonality. The Japan Statistical Office is the 
source for the average monthly household income and monthly inflation data (e-Stat 2018). 
Because the Statistical Office provides prefecture-level data, I constructed the regional monthly 
household income measure as the population-weighted average of the average incomes in the 
prefectures in each region. The income was then inflation-adjusted. Month-of-the-year dummies 
are included in the models to control for seasonality. However, controlling for income and 
seasonality in the models did not change the results significantly (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4. Goodness of fit of the model using true IQOS introduction months vs. placebo 
models (controlling for household income and seasonality) 
Approach 
True 
Model 
R2 
Simultaneous National-Level Placebo Date Models 
 – R2 distribution  
Months 
Tested 
Mean R2 Top 10% Top 5% Max 
1 0.9232 47 0.8730 0.9166 0.9183 0.9194 
2 0.9215 47 0.8730 0.9166 0.9183 0.9194 
3 0.9130 47 0.8676 0.9097 0.9114 0.9123 
                  
                  
Approach 
True 
Model 
R2 
Exact Permutation Test: True Model and Placebo Dates – R2 distribution  
True 
Model 
Rank 
Permutation 
Count 
Significance 
Level 
Mean 
R2 
Top 
10% 
Top 
5% 
Max 
1 0.9232 5 330 1.5% 0.8956 0.9125 0.9170 0.9323 
2 0.9215 4 55 7.3% 0.9042 0.9190 0.9228 0.9262 
3 0.9130 2 15 13.3% 0.8917 0.9130 0.9162 0.9162 
Note: For the simultaneous national-level placebo dates, n=47 (fourth-eight months in the dataset minus 
the first month). The larger the R2 value, the better the model fits. Ordering the models by the Akaike’s and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) yielded the same results 
 
The methodology used in this analysis is not commonly used in the field. The more standard 
approach to data from a natural experiment is a difference-in-difference model. The approach used 
in the analyses presented in this chapter is similar to the difference-in-difference or the two-way 
fixed effects methods. Like those methods, it examines whether the interaction between time and 
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treatment/intervention is statistically significant. This is done by means of Chow’s test in the 
current analysis. Moreover, the current method goes a step further in examining the causal effect 
of IQOS introduction on cigarette sales by performing a series of tests where the dates of IQOS 
introduction are randomly re-arranged between the geographical regions, to check whether the 
observed changes in trends in cigarette sales might be due to chance rather than to IQOS 
introduction. What distinguishes the current approach from the standard methods is that, in this 
analysis, both groups received the treatment (IQOS introduction), but at different times. The 
treatment group received it in September 2015 while the control group received it in April 2016. 
In standard methods, one group receives a treatment, while the other does not. 
Therefore, in the second part of the robustness check, I truncated the data by removing 
observations from April 2016 to August 2018. This created a dataset of a standard natural 
experiment setting with two groups: the treatment group, which received IQOS in September 2015, 
and the control group, in which IQOS was not introduced. Using the two-way fixed effects model 
with the truncated data from Approaches 1, 2 and 3, again, did not change the results. The models 
still indicated that IQOS introduction in September 2015 affected trends in cigarette sales in the 
treatment group, compared to the control group (p<0.001 in Approach 1, p=0.023 in Approach 2, 
and p=0.027 in Approach 3). The results from that analysis are presented in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5. Relationship between IQOS introduction and cigarette sales in Japan: a 
difference-in-difference approach 
 Coefficient estimates 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Time trend 0.17*** 0.11** 0.13* 
Interaction term between 
time and treatment group 
dummy 
-1.00*** -0.74** -0.80** 
Constant 83.82*** 84.19*** 86.09*** 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1; 
In the third part of the robustness check, I focused on the primary independent variable. The 
moment of product introduction might not be the best predictor of the onset of declines in cigarettes 
sales. As mentioned earlier, a newly-introduced product is often initially used by a small group of 
innovators and early adopters. It might take time for the product to be taken up by larger groups 
of consumers. Therefore, patterns of product diffusion are usually s-shaped, with low rate of 
growth in the sales just after product introduction (line segment AB in Figure 3.10), much higher 
growth in sales when the product is being widely adopted during the market expansion period 
(segment BC), and, again, a lower rate of growth at market saturation (segment CD) (Rogers 2003). 
In this chapter, I used point A at the new product market diffusion curve to predict the moment of 
the drop in sales of the old product that is being replaced by the new one. However, it might well 
be that point B (market expansion), and not point A (market introduction), would predict that 
moment better, because that is where the new product is really becoming accepted. 
95 
 
Figure 3.10. Typical patterns of product market diffusion 
 
In most Japanese regions, IQOS diffusion followed the same s-shaped patterns as those observed 
for other products. Figure 3.11 presents those patterns by Japanese regions. It is reasonable to 
assume that if IQOS sales cause a reduction in tobacco cigarette sales, then cigarette sales should 
start sharply declining when the IQOS sales curve increases sharply (once the IQOS market begins 
to expand rapidly), as opposed to when the product is introduced. Therefore, in a separate set of 
models, I determined the time of IQOS market expansion and used that time to predict the drops 
in cigarette sales. 
Sa
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Figure 3.11. IQOS market diffusion in Japan 
 
In the additional models, the month of IQOS expansion is determined by establishing an 
appropriate market volume threshold – the minimum level of sales volume that reliably and 
consistently predicts immediate and rapid diffusion of IQOS in a given region. Specifically, the 
IQOS expansion date in each region is defined by reaching a set threshold of heat sticks sold, 
which I set at one heat stick per capita per month in this case. The threshold of one heat stick per 
capita was chosen arbitrarily, since I could not find an industry document providing a definition 
of market expansion for either IQOS or cigarettes. This alternative method yields IQOS expansion 
dates that are different from the IQOS introduction dates used earlier in the chapter.  
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The regional IQOS expansion dates, as defined for the purpose of this robustness check, are 
presented in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.12. As expected, IQOS expansion dates fall around the time 
when the IQOS sales curve begins to climb. The variation in the expansion date across the regions 
is substantial – the date of IQOS expansion varies from December 2015 in Hokkaido to June 2016 
in Shikoku. 
Table 3.6. IQOS introduction and expansion by region 
Region 
IQOS introduction date 
(Approach 1) IQOS expansion date 
Chugoku Apr-16 May-16 
Hokkaido Sept-15 Dec-15 
Hokuriku Apr-16 May-16 
Kanto Apr-16 May-16 
Keihin Sept-15 Feb-16 
Kinki Sept-15 Apr-16 
Kyushu Apr-16 May-16 
Shikoku Apr-16 June-16 
Shinetsu Apr-16 May-16 
Tohoku Apr-16 Apr-16 
Tokai Sept-15 May-16 
Note: IQOS expansion is defined as the first month the IQOS sales reached one heat stick per 
person per month. 
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Figure 3.12. IQOS expansion in Japan 
 
The “changing growth” time-trend model (Perron 1989) and the Chow test (Chow 1960) were, 
again, used to perform this robustness check. This time, they were used to check whether cigarette 
sales followed the same trends before and after IQOS expansion in Japan. Again, the null 
hypothesis in the test is that the trend in per capita cigarette sales remained stable over time. The 
results of those models were similar to the results on IQOS introduction, presented earlier in this 
chapter. The high value of the Chow test statistic indicates that the null hypothesis of the stability 
of the trend should be rejected (F= 251.90, P<0.001). This means that the trend lines for per capita 
cigarette sales were kinked at the time of expansion of IQOS heated tobacco products in each of 
the eleven Japanese regions. Estimates from the test’s underlying model indicate that, across all 
regions, per capita cigarette sales were slightly increasing before the introduction of IQOS (at a 
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rate of 0.07 cigarettes per person per month on average) but started to decline after the IQOS 
expansion (declining at a rate of 0.69 cigarettes per person per month). 
The comparison of the original model, explaining the trends in cigarette sales by IQOS expansion, 
to the set of placebo models was, again, favorable to the true introduction date model. IQOS 
introduction, which varied across regions, better predicted the timing of cigarette sales decline than 
any one month in all regions (a national-level exogenous shock). Table 3.7 presents the goodness 
of fit of the true introduction date model compared to all possible simultaneous national-level 
placebo date models. 
Checking if cigarette sales declined with IQOS expansion and not by chance is more complicated. 
Unlike the analysis based on IQOS introduction, where there were only two groups of IQOS 
introduction dates (September 2015 and April 2016), there are five groups of dates of IQOS 
expansion to consider (one region with assigned an expansion date in December 2015, one in 
February 2016, two in April 2016, six in May 2016, and one in June 2016). Therefore, while in 
the analysis based on the IQOS introduction dates there were at most 330 possible combinations 
of introduction dates, in this analysis based on expansion dates there are 27 720 possible 
combinations of the expansion date (11x10x(9!/(2!(9-2)!))x(7!/(6!(7-6)!))x1=27720).  
This number of possible permutations is impractically large. While it was relatively easy to 
program the statistical software so that all possible 330 permutations are included in the analysis 
presented earlier in this chapter, it would take much more time to program the almost twenty-eight 
thousand models required for the exact permutation test in this case. Fortunately, the statistics 
literature proposes a solution for instances when performing an exact permutation test becomes 
impractical. Statisticians note that the p-value of the exact premutation test can be approximated 
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by using only a random sample from all permutations (Marozzi 2004). Therefore, the statistical 
approach employed to check whether cigarette sales declined with IQOS expansion and not as a 
result of chance were as follows: first, as in the analysis presented earlier in the chapter, the exact 
set of months of IQOS expansion were repeatedly redistributed so that one or more regions were 
assigned an IQOS expansion date that was associated with a different region. Secondly, unlike the 
analysis based on the IQOS introduction dates, where the time-trend model was estimated on all 
possible combinations of IQOS introduction dates, in this case the models were estimated only on 
a sub-set of all possible combinations of IQOS expansion dates. The statistical literature suggests 
that a sample of 5000 permutations is sufficient to approximate the result of the exact permutation 
test (Marozzi 2004). Using this approach, instead of programming all possible 27 720 
permutations, which would be time-consuming, I programmed the software to randomly select one 
combination of IQOS introduction dates at a time and, if that exact combination was not previously 
chosen, to estimate the model and store the R2 value.  
The model based on the actual dates of expansion ranked in the top 98% (100th out of 5001) of a 
sample of all possible placebo models with combinations of the original IQOS expansion months 
redistributed among regions. Table 3.7 presents the goodness of fit of the true model versus the 
placebo permutation models, while Figure 3.13 presents the histogram of the R2 statistic for the 
placebo models, showing the placement of the test statistic for the true model in the null 
distribution. The results of the randomization test once more indicate that it is unlikely that the 
timing of the observed declines in cigarette sales is unrelated to the appearance of IQOS on the 
Japanese market. 
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Table 3.7. Goodness of fit of the model using true IQOS expansion months vs. placebo models 
True 
Model 
R2 
Simultaneous National-Level Placebo Date Models 
 – R2 distribution 
Months 
Tested 
Mean R2 Top 10% Top 5% Max 
0.7494 47 0.6898 0.7416 0.7434 0.7456 
                
                
True 
Model 
R2 
Permutation Test: True Model and Placebo Dates – R2 distribution 
True 
Model 
Rank 
Permutation 
Count 
Significance 
Level 
Mean 
R2 
Top 
10% 
Top 
5% 
Max 
0.7494 100 5001 2.0% 0.7361 0.7457 0.7476 0.7536 
Note: For the simultaneous national-level placebo dates, n=47 (fourth-eight months in the dataset minus 
the first month). For the permutation test, n=5001 (the original model plus a sample of five thousand models 
with placebo dates). The larger the R2 value the better the model fits. Ordering the models by the Akaike’s 
and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) yielded the same results. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Distribution of R-squared values associated with a sample of five thousand 
possible reassignments of IQOS expansion dates among regions.  
 
Note: The black vertical line indicates R-squared of the true, original model 
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The fourth part of the robustness check also focused on the primary independent variable. In the 
analyses presented in this chapter so far, the trends in cigarettes sales were being explained by a 
single event: IQOS introduction or IQOS expansion. Another issue that requires closer 
examination is how cigarette and heat stick sales volumes are related. Are the cigarettes being 
replaced by heat sticks at a one-to-one ratio? Are the regions with higher growth in IQOS heat 
stick sales also experiencing larger drops in sales of regular, combustible cigarette? 
To answer these questions, I devised a test similar to the one presented above. Regional, monthly 
per capita cigarette sales were regressed on IQOS heat stick sales using a fixed-effects model. The 
model was specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where β0 is an intercept, αi is a set of fixed regional constants, and εit is the error term. The 
dependent variable in this model (yit) is per capita cigarette sales volume in a given region (i) in a 
given month (t). The independent variable is the per capita Heatsticks sales (xit) and αi is a set of 
fixed regional constants. If a link between IQOS and regular cigarette use exists, IQOS sales will 
be reflected in the patterns of cigarette use. To establish more confidently that the association 
between IQOS and cigarette sales is not due to chance, I employed a permutation test in which the 
set of actual observed IQOS per capita sales was repeatedly redistributed so that one or more 
regions were assigned the IQOS sales originally associated with a different region. The model with 
the new combination of the IQOS sales was then estimated and the R2 recorded. Since there are 39 
916 800 (or 11 factorial) possible rearrangements of the original IQOS sales among the eleven 
regions, performing an exact permutation test is, again, impractical. Therefore, following the 
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statistical literature (Marozzi 2004), the procedure was repeated on a sample of five thousand 
possible rearrangements of the original IQOS per capita sales. 
Table 3.8. Relationship between cigarette and IQOS sales in Japan, fixed-effects regression 
 Coefficient estimates Standard Error 
IQOS sales (Heatsticks per capita) -1.20*** 0.03 
Constant 85.72*** 0.23 
Note: N=528, R2=0.7327,*** p<0.001 
Estimates from the test’s underlying model indicate that, across all regions, per capita cigarette 
sales declined by 1.2 cigarette sticks per person (95% CIs [-1.26, -1.13]) with each IQOS sales 
increase of one Heatstick per person (Table 3.8). This suggests that cigarettes were being replaced 
by IQOS heat sticks on the Japanese market. The model based on the actual IQOS sales ranked in 
the top 99% (46th out of 5001) of a sample of all possible placebo models with combinations of 
the original regional IQOS per capita sales redistributed among regions. Table 3.9 presents the 
goodness of fit of the true model against the placebo permutation models, while Figure 3.14 
presents the histogram of the R2 statistic for the placebo models, showing the placement of the test 
statistic for the true model in the null distribution. The results of this randomization test, yet again, 
indicate that it is very unlikely that cigarette sales were not causally related to IQOS sales. 
Table 3.9. Goodness of fit of the model using true IQOS per capita sales vs. placebo models 
True 
Model 
R2 
Permutation Test: True Model and Placebo Sales – R2 distribution 
True 
Model 
Rank 
Permutation 
Count 
Significance 
Level 
Mean 
R2 
Top 
10% 
Top 
5% 
Max 
0.7327 46 5001 0.9% 0.7078 0.7222 0.7260 0.7402 
Note: For the permutation test, n=5001 (the original model plus a sample of five thousand models with 
placebo sales). The larger the R2 value the better the model fits. Ordering the models by the Akaike’s and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) yielded the same results. 
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Figure 3.14. Distribution of R-squared values associated with a sample of five thousand 
possible reassignments of IQOS sales among regions. 
 
Note: The black vertical line indicates r-squared of the true, original model 
 
3.4. Discussion 
The results of this study show that it is very likely that the introduction of IQOS reduced per capita 
cigarette sales in Japan. It is difficult to come up with alternative explanations that can account for 
why the true month of IQOS introduction predicts when cigarette sales began to decline in each 
region better than nearly all possible placebo permutations that redistribute IQOS introduction 
months across regions. Since IQOS introduction, which varied across regions, better predicted the 
timing of cigarette sales decline than any one month across all regions, one can conclude that it is 
not likely that a national-level exogenous shock was the true cause of the observed decline in 
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cigarette sales. In particular, there was no national-level tobacco control legislation implemented 
near the time of IQOS introduction. Japan adopted its first national smoke-free legislation in mid-
2018, which is being implemented in phases through April 2020 (Associated Press 2018). Patterns 
of cigarette use could not be affected by pricing of the products either. Prices of IQOS and 
cigarettes were very similar (21 yen per Heatstick vs. 20 yen per cigarette stick) and stable across 
regions throughout the analysis, making the standard demand analysis inexecutable. Because there 
was little variation in the price variable, it was not possible to use standard economic methods of 
establishing product substitutability to estimate cross-price elasticities of product demand, such as 
those presented in chapter two. Additionally, attempts to control for monthly household income 
and seasonality did not change the models’ results. Cigarette sales trends might have also been 
affected by the rollout of products competing with IQOS, such as British American Tobacco’s Glo 
and Japan Tobacco’s Ploom Tech, but those products were launched nationally much later than 
IQOS – in late 2017 and in 2018, respectively (British American Tobacco 2019; Japan Tobacco 
International 2019) – and their use did not expand nearly as quickly as the use of IQOS (Tabuchi 
et al. 2018). Since most existing regulations have been voluntary self-regulation by the industry 
itself (Katanoda et al. 2014), their implementation locally could, theoretically, coincide with IQOS 
introduction. Alternatively, PMI could have chosen to introduce IQOS in prefectures that they 
anticipated would have a rapid decline in cigarette sales even without IQOS. However, these 
alternative scenarios are not likely. In the past, the tobacco industry has selected test markets for 
new product rollouts that are representative of the total market (Tobin 1986; RJ Reynolds 1989; 
Roper 1994). It is therefore far more likely that PMI chose places in Japan for the early-stage IQOS 
introduction so that they could anticipate what would happen in a national rollout. By doing so, 
they created the natural experiment which was used for this study. 
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The impact of the replacement of IQOS for tobacco cigarette in Japan on population health is 
highly dependent on factors that cannot be determined from sales data alone. Every cigarette 
consumed has a causal impact on disease, but a reduction in sales, driven by reduced prevalence, 
which is caused by reduced smoking initiation or increased smoking cessation would have far 
more clinical meaning than one driven by a prolonged reduction in smoking intensity among dual 
users (e.g., using both cigarettes and IQOS). Also, using PMI’s product equivalence rate of one 
heat stick per cigarette (Philip Morris International 2019c), it appears that the combined sales of 
IQOS and tobacco cigarettes were relatively stable in Japan during this period, especially until 
mid-2017 (Figure 3.15). However, it is unknown whether the availability of HTPs will lead to 
more or to less total tobacco product use over time. Perhaps most importantly, it is not currently 
possible to reach confident conclusions about the level of direct harm users will experience from 
IQOS use, and how this compares to the harms of smoking. Therefore, unless smokers are 
successfully using IQOS as a short-term cessation device, there may be uncertain and potentially 
substantial risks associated with prolonged use of IQOS.  
Regardless of whether the product will have a negative or positive impact on population health in 
the long-run, it seems that it is already beneficial for PMI. According to the company, IQOS retail 
value amounted to over 10 billion USD in 2018 (Philip Morris International 2019b), contributing 
substantially to PMI sales totals, which have been otherwise undermined by drops in cigarette 
sales. In many countries, the product obtained preferential tax rates (Liber 2018) and does not have 
to adhere to the same strict tobacco control regulations as cigarettes. For example, as of 2019, all 
cigarette packs sold in France are standardized and bear a large pictorial health warnings, while 
the packs of IQOS heatsticks are still being sold in appealing packages with only a small text 
warnings. This special status gives a lot of market advantage to the new product. 
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It may not be possible to generalize from patterns of IQOS use and smoking in Japan to other 
countries or products. Higher rates of adoption of charcoal filter cigarettes in previous decades 
may be evidence of a greater priority being placed on perceived reductions in harm by Japanese 
smokers (Assunta and Chapman 2008). The unique characteristics of the Japanese regulatory 
environment may also play a role, including a highly-restrictive approach to non-tobacco vapor 
products such as e-cigarettes (Kennedy et al. 2017), perhaps increasing the likelihood that HTPs 
substitute for higher-exposure tobacco cigarettes as opposed to lower-exposure ENDS, such as e-
cigarettes. In particular, it is uncertain if the findings of this study can be used to predict the effects 
of an IQOS launch in the United States. PMI filed an application with the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to commercialize the product in the United States (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration 2019a), which was recently approved (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2019b). 
It is reasonable to expect that in the US, unlike Japan, PMI will price IQOS at lower levels than 
cigarettes, given its global pricing strategy: a recent international analysis of IQOS prices showed 
that among 26 countries with IQOS price data, in 24 countries (92%) PMI priced IQOS products 
at lower levels than regular cigarettes, with the Eastern European countries of Latvia and Ukraine 
being the only two countries where IQOS costs more than the equivalent in traditional cigarettes 
(Liber 2018). Apart from the ability to price the product at lower levels than cigarettes, PMI also 
has substantial market power in the United States. Philip Morris USA controlled more than half of 
the US cigarette market in 2017 (Altria 2019). In addition, while Philip Morris’s Marlboro brand 
is the number one cigarette brand in all 50 US states (Altria 2019), Marlboro is also a brand that 
PMI uses on its IQOS products globally. It stands to reason that PMI will use the vast market 
power of its US sister company for a vigorous IQOS expansion.  
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There are several limitations to the methodological approach employed in this chapter. First, the 
measure of product use is not perfect. Sales might not reflect product use exactly, with some of 
the purchased product never being used or being used at a later period, and some of the product 
purchased in one region being used in another region. Secondly, the data used in this analysis 
capture cigarette sales in Intage-participating stores only. Cigarette sales captured by Intage (109 
billion sticks sold in 2017) account for 72% of the total cigarette market in Japan from Euromonitor 
International (151 billion cigarettes sold in 2017) (Euromonitor International 2019), suggesting 
the Intage market coverage data are considerable but not complete. Fortunately, the trends in 
cigarette sales from Intage are consistent with those from Euromonitor. Like the Intage data, 
Euromonitor data indicate that cigarette sales were relatively stable before IQOS introduction in 
Japan (1.8% average annual decline from 2011 to 2015), but significantly declined during and after 
IQOS introduction (9.5% average annual decline from 2015 to 2018) (Euromonitor International 
2019). Lastly, specific unknown peculiarities of the methods Intage used to estimate regional 
market sizes, based on data from a sample of stores, the details of which are not available for this 
study, might affect the results. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, the models produce results 
that are significant and robust.  
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Figure 3.15. Combined per capita cigarette and IQOS heat stick sales in Japan
 
Note: Trends seasonally-adjusted using US Census Bureau’s X-13ARIMA-SEATS model. The 
dashed vertical line indicates September 2015 IQOS introduction, while the solid vertical line 
indicates April 2016 IQOS introduction. 
 
3.4.1. Conclusions 
The example of IQOS in Japan demonstrates a circumstance in which cigarette consumption has 
probably been reduced through the introduction of an alternative non-combustible tobacco 
product. That the introduction of a novel tobacco product significantly changes the marketplace 
for tobacco products is important information for policymakers and public health proponents as 
they consider how to alter existing tobacco control policies to accommodate these new products. 
The mechanisms that drove the changes in Japan deserve more attention from scholars in order to 
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identify what lessons in policy formation ought to be transferred to other jurisdictions. The net 
population health impact, however, cannot be assessed without resolving several uncertainties 
related to the direct harms of IQOS and patterns of both smoking and IQOS use.  
The study presented in this chapter also adds to the growing literature on causal inference. 
Although the methodology borrows from the regression discontinuity literature, the use of this 
method in the time-series analysis is novel. Using a natural experiment setup created during the 
rollout of IQOS on the Japanese market, I tested whether different dates of IQOS introduction 
across Japan’s regions are reflected in the patterns of cigarette sales in those regions. I found that 
IQOS introduction, which varied across regions, better predicted the timing of cigarette sales 
decline than any one month across all regions (a national-level exogenous shock), and also than 
nearly all possible rearrangements of the true IQOS introduction months among the regions (exact 
permutation tests). Those findings allow, with reasonable confidence, the inference that the 
relationship between cigarette sales and IQOS introduction in Japan is causal.  
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: PRICE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN GEOGRAPHICAL 
REGIONS4     
4.1. Introduction 
As an alternative to substituting from cigarettes to other tobacco products, some cigarette smokers 
are switching to cigarettes from other jurisdictions. In this case, instead of substituting their 
product for another product, they substitute it for the same product, but purchased elsewhere. The 
existence of between-region price differences incentivizes some smokers from regions with higher 
cigarette prices to switch to cheaper cigarettes available across the border (e.g., of a state, province 
or country). This substitution is a threat to public health, because smokers who substitute to 
cheaper cigarettes from other jurisdictions are less likely to quit smoking or cut down on their 
tobacco consumption.  
Tobacco companies have made the possibility of such product substitution their staple argument 
against any new tobacco control regulations. Policymakers around the world are warned that a 
massive illicit cigarette trade will follow not only any tobacco tax increase, but also package 
regulations, display bans, and virtually any other new tobacco control measure (Drope et al. 2018). 
Numerous academic studies have shown that such claims are largely overstated. For example, in 
South Africa, the tobacco industry created the impression that illicit cigarette trade was rapidly 
growing, when, even according to the industry’s own estimates, this was not the case (Van 
Walbeek and Shai 2014). Nevertheless, there is a general lack of peer-reviewed research on the 
                                                          
4 This chapter is an updated version of manuscript previously published in the Tobacco Control journal (Stoklosa 
2018b). I would like to thank the three anonymous referees for their valuable comments and inputs to this study. 
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magnitude of the substitution toward undutied cigarettes (Van Walbeek et al. 2013; Gallagher et 
al. 2019).  
Given the general lack of credible evidence on the effect of between-region cigarette price 
differentials on the magnitude of cross-border tobacco product substitution, this chapter will 
explore whether the differences in cigarette prices between neighboring countries are associated 
with cross-border cigarette purchasing. The study is conducted using data from the European 
Union (EU). The EU Tax Directives are a set of regulations intended to harmonize cigarette prices 
between Member States to prevent such cross-border purchases and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market of the union (Blecher, Ross, and Stoklosa 2014), but the 
evidence suggests that so far there has been mixed success in achieving price harmony (Lopez and 
Stoklosa 2018a). The analysis in this chapter will, therefore, not only help to assess the scale of 
cross-border tobacco product substitution, but will also evaluate the effectiveness of the Tax 
Directives. 
4.2. Background 
The European Union’s (EU) Tobacco Tax Directive (The Council of the European Union 2011), 
through its minimum tax requirements, is the major driving force behind cigarette tax increases in 
the region (Blecher, Ross, and Stoklosa 2014; Bouw 2017). Those tax increases have resulted not 
only in significant drops in smoking prevalence in Europe (Gallus et al. 2006), but also serve to 
safeguard Member States’ budgetary revenue (Stener Pedersen et al. 2014). Nevertheless, 
substantial differences in cigarette prices between Member States still exist (Lopez and Stoklosa 
2018a). Although inflation-adjusted cigarette prices have been steadily increasing, variation in 
cigarette prices across EU member states persist (see Figure 4.1). Despite tax harmonization efforts 
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in the EU, cigarette prices in the countries from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, which joined 
the EU relatively recently, have not yet reached the levels of the cigarette prices in the rest of the 
Union. In addition, as in the case of Zambia described in chapter two, significant differences 
between cigarette and roll-your-own prices still exist in most EU Member States. In 2015, twenty 
roll-your-own cigarettes cost, on average, almost one euro less than a pack of cigarettes (Lopez 
and Stoklosa 2018a).  
Figure 4.1. Evolution of cigarette prices in the EU, 2004-2017 
Source: Author’s own graph based on data gathered from the European Commission (European 
Commission’s Taxation and Customs Union 2018b) for a manuscript previously published in 
Tobacco Control (Lopez and Stoklosa 2018a). 
 
The Directive specifies that the overall excise rate on cigarettes must be (a) at least EUR 90 per 
1000 cigarettes and (b) at least 60% of the weighted average retail selling price in the Member 
States that apply an excise duty of less than EUR 115 per 1000 cigarettes (The Council of the 
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European Union 2011). The minimum tax rates applicable under the Directive have not been 
revised since 2010 (The Council of the European Union 2010). However, a revision of the 
minimum rates is being considered as of December 2018 (European Commission’s Taxation and 
Customs Union 2018c), making the analysis of the impact of cigarette prices on tax avoidance and 
evasion timely and germane.  
Tobacco tax avoidance refers to legal activities undertaken in order to pay less tobacco tax, or none 
at all, and includes cross-border purchasing of tobacco products within the legal limits for smokers’ 
own consumption (Joossens and Raw 2012). Tobacco tax evasion, on the other hand, refers to 
illegal activities and includes trade in illicitly manufactured and/or smuggled (transported across 
borders illegally) tobacco products (Joossens and Raw 2012). Cross-border purchasing falls into 
the tax evasion category whenever it occurs above the legal limits (smuggling), or when the 
products purchased across the border within the legal limits are for resale and not for personal 
consumption. This chapter focuses on all cross-border purchasing of cigarettes in lower-tax 
jurisdictions by individuals from higher-tax jurisdictions, contributing both to tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. 
Much of the cross-border cigarette purchasing directly undermines all three primary objectives of 
the Tobacco Tax Directives: 1) to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 2) to 
maintain a high level of health protection by using higher excise taxes to drive up tobacco product 
prices and, therefore, lower consumption, and 3) to generate fiscal revenue for Member States 
(Bouw 2017). Moreover, the tax harmonization mechanisms might be the only way to curb cross-
border cigarette purchasing. Since the limits on the number of cigarette packs that can be legally 
transported across EU borders for personal use are high (40 packs) (European Commission’s 
Taxation and Customs Union 2018a), such purchases are most often legal. Therefore, no measures 
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designed to curb illicit cigarette trade, such as law enforcement or the measures listed in the 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (United Nations 2012), would apply to 
cross-border purchases that occur within the legal limits for smokers’ own consumption. 
There is some evidence that indicates that cross-border cigarette purchasing is affected by 
between-country differences in cigarette prices, with lower cigarette prices in a neighboring 
jurisdiction (Nagelhout et al. 2014; Baltagi and Levin 1986; 1992) and larger price difference 
between jurisdictions (Agaku et al. 2016; Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1990; Chaloupka and 
Saffer 1992; Yurekli and Zhang 2000; Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka 2000) being 
significantly associated with more cross-border cigarette purchasing. Proximity provides an 
opportunity for legal cross-border purchases and facilitates illegal activities such as re-selling 
legally purchased cross-border cigarettes, while between-country price difference is an incentive 
for such activities. Efforts to harmonize cigarette prices across the region should decrease cross-
border purchasing, but there is a dearth of studies quantifying both the magnitude and the nature 
of this effect. 
An increasing number of studies that measure tobacco tax avoidance and evasion, and are 
independent from the tobacco industry, are being published (Ross 2015; Gallagher et al. 2019). In 
the EU, such studies involve analyzing the gap between survey-reported cigarette consumption 
and tax-paid sales (HM Revenue & Customs 2017), examining packs presented by smokers 
(Joossens et al. 2014; Guindon et al. 2014), and collecting packs discarded as litter (Stoklosa and 
Ross 2014). These studies, however, do not distinguish between large-scale illicit trade and cross-
border purchasing. Only a few studies use European data to focus on cross-border purchasing 
specifically. A 2013 study analyzes survey data from five EU countries and finds that cross-border 
purchasing might be more frequent in regions bordering countries with lower cigarette prices, but 
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that the overall magnitude of the problem is not large (Nagelhout et al. 2014). A more recent study 
uses survey data for smokers in 27 Member States to study the impact of price differences on cross-
border cigarette purchasing in the EU (Agaku et al. 2016). The study finds that, although the effects 
of between-country price differences on cross-border cigarette purchasing are significant, only 4% 
of all EU smokers purchased most of their products through cross-border transitions. However, 
both studies use survey-reported data, which might be affected by the fact that tax avoidance 
activities are often underreported. Moreover, because these studies asked about cross-border 
purchasing by smokers themselves, they do not capture instances when the cigarettes were bought 
abroad by other individuals, such as a smoker’s family member or a friend. Finally, both studies 
use a single cross-section of data and, therefore, a causal relationship cannot be established.  
This study aims to shed light on the effects of cigarette price differences between EU Member 
States on cross-border cigarette purchases. Additional evidence on this relationship is needed to 
guide tobacco tax policies in Europe. This study verifies findings by Agaku and colleagues, but 
uses methods that are free from potential reporting bias attached to the analysis of survey data. 
4.3. Data and Methods 
The method employed in the current study involves analyzing aggregate data on cigarette prices 
and tax-paid sales using panel techniques. This method was developed by Becker et al. (1990), 
and was applied in other studies on US data (Chaloupka and Saffer 1992; Yurekli and Zhang 2000) 
and, in a slightly modified version, on 1989-95 data from several European countries (Merriman, 
Yurekli, and Chaloupka 2000). It is based on the notion that if cross-border price differences affect 
cigarette purchasing from neighboring regions, those purchases should be reflected in higher tax-
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paid sales in the country with lower cigarette prices where the purchases took place (exporting 
country) and in lower tax-paid sales in the country with higher cigarette prices (importing country). 
Since this study focuses on EU Member States only, the analysis starts in 2004, when ten new 
Members joined the EU. For the same reason, data for Bulgaria and Romania from before 2007 
and for Croatia from before 2013 were dropped. The analysis covers the period up to 2017, the 
last year for which data on the number of cigarettes released for consumption were available at the 
time of the analysis (August 2018). Therefore, the total number of observations in this study is 377 
(28x14 – 9 (Croatia) – 2x3 (Romania and Bulgaria)). 
4.3.1. Data Sources 
This study uses longitudinal, 2004-2017 data for 28 EU Member States. The data were obtained 
from various sources. The number of cigarettes released for consumption and cigarette price data 
for the EU Member States are from the European Commission (European Commission’s Taxation 
and Customs Union 2018b). The European Commission is also the source for data on the border 
population (defined as the number of people living within 25 kilometers from the border) of the 
EU countries and their neighbors (Müller 2018), as well as for data on gasoline prices (European 
Commission 2018). Although the study focuses on cigarette sales in the EU Members States only, 
it takes into account cigarette prices in bordering non-EU countries. Cigarette prices for those EU-
neighboring countries are from Euromonitor (Euromonitor International 2019). Per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, and population data are from the World Bank (World Bank 
2018b). Scores for non-price tobacco control measures (smoke-free air laws, help available to quit 
tobacco use, warnings about the dangers of tobacco, and bans on tobacco advertising, promotion 
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and sponsorship) are from the World Health Organization (World Health Organization 2017). A 
full dataset used in this study is now published at The Tobacco Atlas web page (Stoklosa 2018a).  
4.3.2. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is per capita cigarette sales measured by the number of cigarettes released 
for consumption. This reflects the number of cigarettes that were released from bonded warehouses 
to be sold in each Member State each year. Releases for consumption can be artificially high in 
certain years due to stockpiling, i.e. when large quantities of cigarettes are released to the market 
prior to tax increases to avoid the new, higher taxes. However, a clear majority of Member States 
(19 out of 28 in 2014) apply anti-stockpiling measures, which aim to limit the ability of economic 
operators to take advantage of the lower excise rates before a planned tax change (Stener Pedersen 
et al. 2014). These measures include caps on tax stamps (e.g. companies cannot purchase 
significantly more stamps than in previous years in the same time of the year), caps on release for 
consumption (e.g. the number of cigarettes that can be released for consumption during the yearend 
is limited), and sell-by date (e.g. excise stamps applied on cigarette packs in a given year in Poland 
are valid only until the end of February of the next year (Senate of the Republic of Poland 2009)). 
The countries that did not have anti-stockpiling measures in 2014 were Austria, the Czech 
Republic Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and Spain (Stener Pedersen et al. 
2014). Moreover, for 253 out of the 377 observations in the sample, the tax rate changed in the 
following year (European Commission’s Taxation and Customs Union 2018b). Therefore, with 
the anti-stockpiling measures in place and the frequent tax increases, the number of cigarettes 
released for consumption should closely reflect the tax-paid sales in the EU Member countries. 
For countries without anti-stockpiling measures in place, I assume that the carry-over stock in one 
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year is similar to the carry-over stock the next year. The sales for each year are divided by the 
countries’ estimated adult population (15+) to obtain a per capita measure. 
4.3.3. Primary independent variables 
The primary independent variables are the population-weighted between-country differences in 
cigarette prices. Those variables are constructed following the methods developed by Becker et al. 
(1990). The import incentive variable for cross-border cigarette purchasing is defined as follows: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Σ𝑗𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡) 
where Kij is the fraction of the population of the higher-price, importing, country i living in the 
border regions neighboring the lower-price country j (Kij=Border_POPij/POPi). Weight K is 
included in the formula to reflect the fact that the greater the proportion of the population living 
near the border with the lower-price country, the more likely cross-border cigarette purchases from 
that country are. The sum is taken over all lower-price neighboring countries. The export incentive 
variable is defined as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Σ𝑗𝐾𝑗𝑖(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡)(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗/𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖) 
where Kji is, again, the fraction of the population of the higher-price country j living in the border 
regions neighboring the lower-price, exporting country i. POPj and POPi represent the total 
populations of the high-price and low-price countries, respectively. The sum is taken over all 
higher-price neighboring countries. 
The relative-population weight is included in the formula for the exports incentives to reflect the 
fact that exporting cigarettes to a larger neighbor is more likely to affect per capita sales in the 
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lower-price country, than exporting to a smaller neighbor is, simply because more cigarettes are 
expected to be exported to a larger neighbor than to a smaller neighbor. In a concrete example, 
assume that Spain is an exporting country. Then, according to this model, two factors will affect 
Spain exporting to France and to Portugal. First, it is affected by the number of French and 
Portuguese people living near the Spanish borders (captured by the Kji). Secondly, it is affected by 
how large France and Portugal are compared to Spain (captured by the relative-population ratio). 
The inference is that there is much greater potential to export to France than to Portugal, simply 
because the population of France is more than 6 times larger than that of Portugal.  
Cigarette prices used in this study are the Weighted Average Prices (WAP) expressed in euros. 
Before 2010, the EU Member States did not report WAP to the European Commission, reporting 
the Most Popular Price Category (MPPC) instead. However, the difference between MPPC and 
WAP is very small (4% on average among those countries which continued reporting both WAP 
and MPPC) (Lopez and Stoklosa 2018a). Therefore, MPPC was used as a proxy for WAP for EU 
Member States for the years before 2010. For non-EU countries, WAP was calculated using the 
formula from the 2010 EU Tax Directive (The Council of the European Union 2010), that is, by 
dividing total cigarette value by the total quantity of cigarettes reported by Euromonitor 
(Euromonitor International 2019).  
The dataset of the EU border regions, obtained from the European Commission, consisted of 973 
level-3 geographical regions from the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics classification 
(NUTS3 regions) (Eurostat 2018b). The dataset covers both regions along terrestrial borders and 
those along maritime borders. Maritime borders are defined as coastlines located at less than 150 
km from overseas coastlines (see Figure 4.2). For example, parts of France and the UK share a 
maritime border, because their coastlines are less than 150 km apart. Spain and the UK do not 
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share a maritime border, because their coastlines are more than 150 km apart. As well as the border 
regions in the EU Member States, the dataset includes border regions in several non-EU countries 
that border EU countries (Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey)5. In the 
dataset, there are also  estimates of each region’s border population in 2011, defined as the number 
of people living within 25 kilometers from the border.  
To construct the weights for the import and export incentive variables, I first dropped overseas 
regions of Spain (Fuerteventura and Lanzarote) and France (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, La 
Réunion, and Mayotte) that were included in the dataset, but that are not relevant for the analysis, 
because of the lack of geographical proximity. The 2011 estimates of border populations for the 
remaining European regions were then added up along each border and, together with the 2011 
estimates of the total countries’ populations, were used to construct the weights. These computed 
weights and 2004-2017 cigarette prices were then used to compute the import and export incentive 
variables for each country and each year, according to the formulas described above. All import 
and export variables were adjusted for eurozone inflation. 
 
                                                          
5 Information on the border population of many non-EU countries is missing from the database. However, this 
information is only needed to calculate the exports incentive variable if the non-EU country had higher price than a 
given EU Member State, and hence the EU country has an incentive to export. As explained later in this chapter, there 
were only three instances when a non-EU country (Serbia) had higher cigarette prices than an EU-country (Romania).  
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Figure 4.2. Border NUTS3 regions in the European Union 
 
Note: Although regions vary in size, weights used in this study are based only on the estimated 
number of individuals living within 25 km from each border.  
Source: Author’s own map created based on European Commission data (European Commission’s 
Taxation and Customs Union 2018b). 
 
The dataset of the EU border regions includes estimates of border population in several EU-
neighboring countries with relatively high cigarette prices (Lichtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland). This permits the computation of import and export variables covering not only 
internal but also external EU borders. For three cases when the border population data for a non-
EU member, necessary to construct the variables, were not available (all three for exports to 
Serbia), it was assumed that there was no between-country price difference in those cases.  
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Subsequently, I constructed import and export incentive variables covering internal and external 
EU borders, both terrestrial and maritime. I also constructed separate variables for EU internal 
versus EU external borders and for terrestrial versus maritime borders. These additional variables 
permit analyses that are more precise and advanced than any of the previous studies employing a 
similar methodology (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1990; Chaloupka and Saffer 1992; Yurekli 
and Zhang 2000; Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka 2000). 
Another way of looking at the import and export incentives is in terms of transaction costs. With 
this approach, the decision to purchase cigarettes across the border is influenced by the cost of the 
trip. I therefore used gasoline prices as a proxy of the transaction costs of cross-border cigarette 
purchasing, weighting the cross-border price differences by gasoline prices rather than by border 
population. The methods used to construct the gasoline price-weighted incentive variables and the 
results from the models using those incentive variables are presented in the Robustness Check 
section of this chapter. 
4.3.4. Covariates 
Other variables in the multivariable analyses are cigarette prices, measured by WAP and MPPC, 
as described above, and per capita income, measured by per capita GDP. Both variables are 
expressed in euros and are adjusted for inflation. To control for other, non-price tobacco control 
measures, I use scores for smoke-free air laws, help available to quit tobacco use, warnings about 
the dangers of tobacco, and bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, all taken 
from the WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic (World Health Organization 2017). The 
WHO scores are valued from one (least implemented measure) to five (fully implemented 
measure).  
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Attempts to control for each of the non-price tobacco control measures separately created 
collinearity problems in the models, because governments often implement several measures 
together. As suggested by Saffer and Chaloupka, a way to avoid multicollinearity in such cases is 
to create dummy variables for combined multiple tobacco control measures (Saffer and Chaloupka 
2000). Therefore, I use a dummy variable that reflects strong implementation of all four non-price 
tobacco control measures – i.e. the value of the WHO score for each of the measures is four or 
five.  
The WHO scores for the four measures are available for 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 only. 
In 2008, except for the UK, each EU Member State was still lagging behind its stated intention in 
the implementation of at least one non-price tobacco control measure (World Health Organization 
2017). Therefore, for the years 2004-2008, the dummy for non-price tobacco control measures 
takes the value of zero in all EU countries, except the UK. The UK dummy takes the value of zero 
for the years 2004-2006 and one for the years 2007-2017, because the country had already 
implemented comprehensive tobacco control laws in 2007 (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 
2018). For all countries, the missing values for 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 were imputed 
using values from the preceding year.  
4.3.5. Statistical analysis 
Pooled time-series data are used to estimate the impact of the between-country cigarette price 
differences on cigarette sales. The model was specified as follows: 
y𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2x2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3x3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3x4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖+𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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where β0 is an intercept, αi is a set of fixed country constants, αt is a set of fixed time constants, 
and εit is the error term. The dependent variable in this model (yit) is a logarithm of per capita 
cigarette sales volume in a given country (i) in a given year (t). The independent variables are the 
logarithm of inflation-adjusted average cigarette price (x1it), logarithm of inflation-adjusted per 
capita income (x2it), dummy for strong implementation of four non-price tobacco control measures 
(x3it), and a vector for import and export incentive variables (x4it). The estimated coefficient β1 
represents price elasticity of demand for cigarettes, while β2 represents income elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes. Country fixed effects are included in the models to control for unobserved, 
stable, characteristics of the countries, such as the social acceptability of tobacco use or the general 
level of tobacco control regulations. Year fixed effects are also included to capture trends over 
time as well as unobserved events in EU-level tobacco control, such as the implementation of the 
Tobacco Products Directive in 2016 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
2014).  
The Hausman test was used to determine whether the country and time fixed effects should be 
included in the model. The null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that the preferred model is the 
random effects model versus the alternative that the fixed effects is preferred. Specifically, the test 
examines whether the covariance between xit and α from the above equation is equal to zero. If the 
value of the covariance is zero, then both the random effects and the fixed effects estimators are 
consistent, but the random effects is preferred, as it is the more efficient estimator. Alternatively, 
if the value of the covariance is not zero, then the fixed effects estimator is solely consistent and, 
therefore, the fixed effects model is preferred. Previous work with a similar panel model setup, but 
on US data, found the time fixed effects not to be justified (Gallet, Hoover, and Lee 2006). 
However, the result of the Hausman test for this study strongly suggests using both country 
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(Hausman test: χ²=48.49, p<0.001) and year (Hausman test: χ²=80.19, p<0.001) fixed effects in 
the model.  
Another model setup that was considered for this study is the mixed effects model. Mixed effects 
models work well with many panel data studies, because they produce fixed-effect estimates for 
the time-varying predictors as well as random-effect estimates for the time invariant predictors. 
The mixed effects method works perfectly with, for example, longitudinal survey data where there 
are both time-invariant predictors (e.g. gender) and time-variant predictors (e.g. income). 
However, in the case of the EU cigarette sales data there are no time-invariant predictors. All the 
explanatory variables in the models used in this study change over time. Thus, the mixed effects 
models were not used in this analysis. 
The assumption behind the models used in this analysis is that if the between-country differences 
in cigarette prices led to cross-border cigarette purchases from neighboring countries with lower 
cigarette prices, cigarette sales in the higher-priced country would be negatively affected. In such 
a case, one would expect the coefficient for the import incentive variable to be significant and 
negative. Similarly, if the between-country differences in cigarette prices led to cross-border 
cigarette sales to neighboring countries with higher cigarette prices, cigarette sales in the lower-
priced country would be positively affected. In such a case, one would expect the coefficient for 
the export incentive variable to be significant and positive. Sales, price, and income were logged, 
so that the estimated coefficients of the price and income variables represent price and income 
elasticities, respectively. 
In the first model specification, the vector for import and export incentive variables (x4it) includes 
import and export incentive variables covering internal and external EU borders, both terrestrial 
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and maritime (Model 1). The second specification includes separate import and export variables 
for terrestrial and maritime borders (Model 2). In the third model specification, separate import 
and export variables for internal terrestrial and external terrestrial borders are included (Model 3).  
4.4. Results 
Table 4.1 summarizes the key variables, while Table 4.2 presents 2017 values of key variables by 
country. All extremely high values of per capita cigarette sales (above 4,000 cigarettes per adult 
annually) are for Luxemburg, a country known for serving as a source of cross-border purchased 
cigarettes for France (Bogdanovica et al. 2011) and Germany (Hanewinkel and Isensee 2007). 
Cigarette sales at above 3,500 sticks per adult annually were also found in 2004-2009 in Greece, 
a country with historically one of the highest cigarette consumption levels in the world (Harvard 
School of Public Health 2011). The lowest levels of consumption (below 600 sticks per adult per 
year) were found in recent years in the UK, Europe’s highest performer in tobacco control 
(Joossens and Raw 2017). The lowest cigarette price in the database (0.67 euro per pack) was 
reported in Latvia in 2005, just after the country joined the EU. The EU Directive’s minimum rates 
still did not apply in Latvia at that time owing to the transition arrangement that the country 
negotiated before joining the EU (Blecher, Ross, and Stoklosa 2014). The highest cigarette prices, 
more than 10 euros per pack, were recently recorded in Ireland and the UK. Seventeen countries 
never achieved strong implementation of all non-price tobacco control measures, while eleven 
Member States strongly implemented those measures at some point between 2007 and 2017.  
The highest value of the import incentive variable was for Malta in 2004, due to the price difference 
between Malta and Italy. Although the price difference was relatively small (1.08 euro per pack), 
the fact that the entire population of Malta lives in a border region with Italy drove the value of 
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the incentive variable up. The country with the second largest values for the import incentive 
variables was Finland, caused by the country’s high price difference with its EU neighbor, Estonia. 
The two countries share a maritime border. Estonia has had much cheaper cigarettes than Finland 
throughout the analysis, with the maximum price difference amounting to 3.15 euro per pack in 
2004. 
The values of export incentive variables are generally larger than the values of import incentive 
variables, mainly due to the presence of the relative population weight in the export incentive 
variable. The largest value of the export incentive variables was for Estonia, as a result of the 
above-mentioned price difference with Finland. The country with the second largest value of 
export incentive variables is Luxemburg. Even though the price difference between Luxemburg 
and its neighbors was not as large as the price difference between Latvia and Finland, the value of 
the export incentive variable was driven up by the relative population weight. As Luxemburg is a 
small, low-priced country neighboring two large, higher-price countries (France and Germany), 
there is a high potential for Luxemburg to serve as a source of cross-border purchased cigarettes 
for its neighbors.  
Both the largest and the smallest absolute price differences between neighboring counties were for 
Finland. In 2012, cigarettes in Finland cost up to 7.88 euros per pack less than in its non-EU 
neighbor, Norway. In 2017, on the other hand, Finland’s cigarettes were up to 4.85 euros per pack 
more expensive than in its non-EU neighbor, Russia. In both cases, however, the values of the 
import and export incentive variables for Finland were not extreme, because very few people live 
close to the borders between Finland and Norway and between Finland and Russia. In fact, regions 
around the border between Finland and Norway are one of the least densely populated regions in 
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Europe, which makes cross-border cigarette purchasing by shoppers coming from Norway to 
Finland very rare.  
Incentives for imports across maritime borders are significantly greater than those for terrestrial 
borders (t=-3.17, p<0.01), while the export incentive variables do not differ according to whether 
the border is terrestrial or maritime (t=-1.17, p=0.24) (Table 4.1). Focusing on terrestrial borders 
only, incentives for EU countries to import from other EU countries (through internal borders) do 
not differ from incentives to import from non-EU countries (through external borders) (t=-0.34, 
p=0.73). However, the incentives for EU countries to export within the EU (across internal 
borders) are significantly greater than the incentives for EU countries to export to non-EU 
countries (across external borders) (t=6.40, p<0.01).  
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Per adult cigarette sales (sticks) 1887 1805 526 17122 
Cigarette price per pack (euros) 4.13 1.85 0.67 10.12 
Per capita income (GDP-measured, euros) 27699 17622 5040 92380 
Dummy for strong implementation of four 
non-price tobacco control measures 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Import incentive (1) 
internal and external terrestrial and maritime 
borders 0.23 0.28 0.00 1.38 
Export incentive (1) 
internal and external terrestrial and maritime 
borders 0.54 0.98 0.00 5.09 
Import incentive (2a) 
internal and external terrestrial borders 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.51 
Export incentive (2a) 
internal and external terrestrial borders 0.24 0.66 0.00 4.41 
Import incentive (2b) 
internal and external maritime borders 0.14 0.28 0.00 1.37 
Export incentive (2b) 
internal and external maritime borders 0.30 0.79 0.00 5.09 
Import incentive (3a) 
internal terrestrial borders 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.45 
Export incentive (3a) 
internal terrestrial borders 0.23 0.66 0.00 4.41 
Import incentive (3b) 
external terrestrial borders 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.31 
Export incentive (3b) 
external terrestrial borders 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.29 
Number of observations: 377 
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Table 4.2. Key variable values in 2017 
Country 
 
Cigarette 
price per 
pack 
(euros) 
EU 
Member 
Per adult 
cigarette 
sales 
(sticks) 
Dummy for 
strong 
implementation 
of four non-
price tobacco 
control 
measures 
Import 
incentive 
1 
Export 
incentive 
1 
Austria 4.76 Yes 1636 0 0.259 0.412 
Belgium 5.88 Yes 1013 0 0.030 1.451 
Bulgaria 2.57 Yes 2258 1 0.058 0.157 
Croatia 3.19 Yes 1741 0 0.242 0.753 
Cyprus 4.28 Yes 1313 0 0.840 0.000 
Czechia 3.31 Yes 2318 0 0.023 0.439 
Denmark 5.40 Yes 1273 0 0.016 1.217 
Estonia 3.55 Yes 1525 0 0.166 4.312 
Finland 6.70 Yes 908 0 1.240 0.005 
France 6.81 Yes 805 0 0.150 0.424 
Germany 5.64 Yes 1055 0 0.106 0.137 
Greece 4.10 Yes 1302 1 0.213 0.067 
Hungary 3.59 Yes 845 1 0.181 0.057 
Ireland 10.07 Yes 953 1 0.672 0.000 
Italy 4.76 Yes 1324 0 0.180 0.070 
Latvia 3.20 Yes 1156 1 0.207 0.033 
Lithuania 3.18 Yes 1208 0 0.288 0.002 
Luxembourg 4.60 Yes 5700 0 0.000 3.109 
Malta 5.25 Yes 1252 1 0.494 0.000 
Netherlands 6.19 Yes 693 0 0.167 0.165 
Poland 3.20 Yes 1286 0 0.064 0.061 
Portugal 4.47 Yes 1219 1 0.000 0.005 
Romania 3.46 Yes 1416 1 0.347 0.005 
Slovakia 3.23 Yes 1544 0 0.071 0.145 
Slovenia 3.51 Yes 2084 0 0.097 0.798 
Spain 4.52 Yes 1126 1 0.179 0.031 
Sweden 6.03 Yes 650 0 0.240 0.090 
United 
Kingdom  
8.83 Yes 526 1 0.633 0.049 
Albania 1.13 No - - - - 
Belarus 0.64 No - - - - 
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Country 
Cigarette 
price per 
pack 
(euros) 
EU 
Member 
Per adult 
cigarette 
sales 
(sticks) 
Dummy for 
strong 
implementation 
of four non-
price tobacco 
control 
measures 
Import 
incentive 
1 
Export 
incentive 
1 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2.26 No - - - - 
Liechtenstein 10.17 No - - - - 
Montenegro 1.7 No - - - - 
Morocco 2.28 No - - - - 
Norway 11.61 No - - - - 
Republic of 
Moldova 
1.04 No - - - - 
Russian 
Federation 
1.85 No - - - - 
Serbia 1.94 No - - - - 
Switzerland 8.11 No - - - - 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
0.74 No - - - - 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
1.28 No - - - - 
Tunisia 1.41 No - - - - 
Turkey 2.56 No - - - - 
Ukraine 0.77 No - - - - 
 
Results from the models capturing the effects of between-country price difference on cross-border 
cigarette purchases are presented in Table 4.3. Cigarette price significantly affects cigarette sales 
in the EU. Estimated price elasticity varies, depending on the model specification, from -0.47 to -
0.35. Estimated income elasticity is positive and significant in all models (from 0.66 to 0.70). The 
estimated effects of non-price tobacco control policies all have the expected negative sign and 
reach significance at the 0.05 level in Model 1 and at the 0.10 level in Models 2 and 3. The 
coefficients for both import and export incentive variables have the expected sign in all models 
(negative for import incentive and positive for export incentive), except for the export incentive 
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across maritime borders (2b) in Model 2. In Model 1, the overall effect of price differences on 
cross-border purchasing is not significant. When the effects of between-country price differences 
are estimated separately for maritime and terrestrial borders, the import and export incentive 
variables are significant for terrestrial borders (joint test: F=9.25, p<0.01), but not for maritime 
borders (joint test: F=0.25, p=0.78). After the effects of those incentives are further disentangled 
into separate effects for EU internal terrestrial borders and EU external terrestrial borders, the 
incentives for EU countries to trade within the EU (across internal borders) are jointly significant 
(joint test: F=8.19, p<0.01), while incentives for EU countries to trade with non-EU countries 
(across external borders) are not (joint test: F=1.56, p=0.21). When the model is estimated only 
for countries with external EU borders (n=251), the incentive variables for external borders are 
still not significant (F<0.01, p=0.99). 
Table 4.3. Cigarette sales in Europe: fixed-effects models 
Variables Border type included in the incentive 
variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Terrestrial Maritime Internal External    
Price elasticity     -0.47*** -0.38*** -0.35*** 
Income elasticity     0.70*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 
Dummy for strong 
implementation of four 
non-price tobacco 
control measures 
    
-0.07** -0.06* -0.06* 
Import incentive (1) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -0.04   
Export incentive (1) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 0.03   
Import incentive (2a) ✓  ✓ ✓  -0.42**  
Export incentive (2a) ✓  ✓ ✓  0.27***  
Import incentive (2b)  ✓ ✓ ✓  -0.003  
Export incentive (2b)  ✓ ✓ ✓  -0.03  
Import incentive (3a) ✓  ✓    -0.38* 
Export incentive (3a) ✓  ✓    0.27*** 
Import incentive (3b) ✓   ✓   -0.59 
Export incentive (3b) ✓   ✓   0.55 
Constant     1.10 1.38 1.26 
Number of observations: 377; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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4.4.1. Robustness check 
One concern with the study presented in this chapter is with the parameter of border population 
that this study uses as a weight of cross-border price differences. Because there are no estimates 
of the border population for years other than 2011, the method assumes that the proportion of the 
population living near the borders of the EU Member States did not significantly change 
throughout the period of this analysis. However, this assumption may not be plausible. Each year, 
the EU receives many immigrants from non-EU countries, and many EU citizens relocate to other 
Member States. For example, in 2016, 2.3 million EU citizens relocated to a another Member State 
and 2 million non-EU citizens immigrants arrived in the EU from a non-EU country (Eurostat 
2018a). This statistic also does not account for EU citizens who relocated within their country., It 
might therefore not be reasonable to believe that all border populations remained relatively 
unchanged in recent years. 
As a robustness check, as well as weighting the cross-border price differences by the 2011 border 
population, I ran the analysis weighting the price differences by yearly gasoline prices. This 
approach assumes that cross-border cigarette purchasing behaviors are influenced by the 
transaction costs, measured by the gasoline cost, rather than by the number of people living near 
the border.  
The gasoline price data are from the European Commission (European Commission 2018). They 
reflect the price of the Euro-super 95 gasoline (taxes included) as of the first week of June each 
year. Since the gasoline prices were available for the EU countries only, the models weighting the 
cross-border price differences by the gasoline price are for the EU internal borders only. In those 
models, the import incentive variable for cross-border cigarette purchasing is defined as follows: 
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𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖 = Σ𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡) 
where Git is the proportion of the EU average gasoline price in year t to the gasoline price in the 
importing (Model 4 and 5) or exporting (Model 6 and 7) country that year 
(Git=Average_gasoline_pricet/Gasoline_priceit). Weight G is included in the formula to reflect the 
fact that the higher the gasoline price, the higher the transaction costs, the less likely it is that cross-
border cigarette purchases from that country will occur. The export incentive variable is defined 
as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Σ𝑗𝐺𝑖𝑡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑡−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡)(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗/𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖) 
where Git is, as before, the proportion of the EU average gasoline price in year t to the gasoline 
price in the exporting (Model 4 and 5) or importing (Model 6 and 7) country that year. Models 4 
and 5 assume that the gasoline is purchased in country i, while Models 6 and 7 assume that both 
gasoline and cigarettes are purchased in the country bordering i. The results from these models are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Cigarette sales in Europe: fixed-effects models with gasoline price used as a 
cross-border price difference weight 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Price elasticity -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
Income elasticity 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
Dummy for strong implementation of four non-
price tobacco control measures -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** 
Import incentive  
Internal borders and gasoline price from the 
importing country -0.001    
Export incentive  
Internal borders and gasoline price from the 
exporting country 0.002***    
Import incentive  
Internal terrestrial borders and gasoline price 
from the importing country  -0.01   
Export incentive  
Internal terrestrial borders and gasoline price 
from the exporting country  0.002***   
Import incentive  
Internal borders and gasoline price from the 
exporting country   -0.004  
Export incentive  
Internal borders and gasoline price from the 
importing country   0.002***  
Import incentive 
Internal terrestrial borders and gasoline price 
from the exporting country    -0.01 
Export incentive  
Internal terrestrial borders and gasoline price 
from the importing country    0.002*** 
Constant 0.96 1.08 1.06 1.15 
Number of observations: 377; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
 
Weighting the cross-border price differences by yearly gasoline prices instead of weighing it by 
the 2011 border population did not change the results substantially. The estimated price elasticity, 
the income elasticity, and the coefficient for the dummy for strong implementation of four non-
price tobacco control measures are almost identical in the models weighted by gasoline prices to 
those weighted by border population. As well, the estimated impact of reducing incentives from 
cross-border purchasing down to zero on sales in an exporting country is also very similar in the 
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models weighted by gasoline prices and in the models weighted by border population. Weighting 
by the minimum gasoline price between the two countries did not change the results either. This 
suggests that the results presented in this chapter are robust to the type of weight used for the cross-
border price difference: it is the price difference that affects the cross-border cigarette purchases, 
irrespective of whether population or gasoline prices are used as weights. 
Luxembourg seems to be an outlier in this study. With extremely high per capita cigarette sales 
and export incentives (Table 4.2), the country stands out from the rest of the EU. As estimated by 
the consultants KPMG, as much as 81% of cigarettes legally sold in Luxembourg in 2016 were 
not consumed in the country, but were rather purchased in Luxembourg to be smoked in other 
countries (KPMG 2017). No other EU country had cigarette outflows constituting so large a 
portion of the market as Luxembourg. Although the KPMG estimates have to be used with caution, 
because they might represent the interests of the tobacco industry (Gilmore et al. 2014), they 
indicate that the cross-border purchasing in Luxembourg is an anomaly in Europe. Therefore, in 
another robustness check, I removed Luxembourg from the dataset to check how my estimates 
would behave without this country. 
Removing Luxembourg from the models did not change the estimates of the price and income 
elasticities significantly. These results are presented in Table 4.5. Cigarette price still significantly 
affects cigarette sales in the EU. Estimated price elasticity varies, depending on the model 
specification (from -0.50 to -0.41). Estimated income elasticity (from 0.68 to 0.72) and the effects 
of non-price tobacco control policies (from -0.07 to -0.08) are also significant. The import 
incentive variables are not significant in the first model specification, but are significant in the 
other two model specifications and have a similar magnitude to those estimated in the full-sample 
models. One major difference between the estimates from these models and the estimates from the 
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full sample presented earlier in this chapter is that the export incentive variable is not significant 
in any of the models. This suggests that Luxembourg was largely a cigarette-exporting country. 
Table 4.5. Cigarette sales in Europe: fixed-effects models with Luxembourg removed 
Variables Border type included in the incentive 
variable 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 
10 
 Terrestrial Maritime Internal External    
Price elasticity     -0.50*** -0.41*** -0.42*** 
Income elasticity     0.72*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 
Dummy for strong 
implementation of 
four non-price 
tobacco control 
measures 
    
-0.08** -0.07** -0.07** 
Import incentive (1) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -0.05   
Export incentive (1) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ -0.02   
Import incentive (2a) ✓  ✓ ✓  -0.48**  
Export incentive (2a) ✓  ✓ ✓  0.01  
Import incentive (2b)  ✓ ✓ ✓  -0.002  
Export incentive (2b)  ✓ ✓ ✓  -0.02  
Import incentive (3a) ✓  ✓    -0.50** 
Export incentive (3a) ✓  ✓    -0.08 
Import incentive (3b) ✓   ✓   -0.30 
Export incentive (3b) ✓   ✓   0.30 
Constant     0.93 1.20 1.29 
Number of observations: 377; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
 
4.5. Discussion 
This study shows that in an average EU Member State only a small portion of cigarette sales can 
be explained by cross-border purchasing, which includes both individual smokers cross-border 
shopping, as well as larger scale bootlegging of purchases in lower-tax jurisdictions for resale in 
higher-tax jurisdictions. Taking the value of the estimated coefficient for imports across EU 
internal terrestrial borders (coef: -0.38 from Model 3), the value of that coefficient indicates that, 
in a theoretical scenario, when incentives for cross-border imports fall from their mean level (i.e. 
0.04) to zero, ceteris paribus, local sales would increase by about 1.5% (0.38*0.04). At the same 
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time, reducing incentives for cross-border exports through EU internal terrestrial borders down to 
zero, ceteris paribus, would reduce sales by about 6% (0.27*0.23). These results were similar 
(from 4% to 6%) in the models where the EU cross-border price differences were weighted by 
gasoline prices instead of by border population. The mean value of the export incentive variable 
varied from 22 in Model 7 to 29 in Model 4. Therefore, when the value of the estimated coefficient 
for exports across EU internal borders is taken (coef: 0.002 in Models 4 to 7), the value of that 
coefficient indicates that, in a theoretical scenario, when incentives for cross-border exports fall 
from its mean level to zero, ceteris paribus, sales in the exporting countries would fall by between 
4% (0.002*22) and 6% (0.002*29). In reality, reducing the between-country price differences 
would require an adjustment in domestic price as well. Therefore, the equilibrium for tax-paid 
sales if there are no cross-border price differences is harder to predict. The equilibrium would be 
different, depending whether it was achieved through an upward adjustment of cigarette prices 
across Member States, a downward adjustment of cigarette prices, or an adjustment to the mean 
price. However, some useful inferences can still be made based on the value and ratio of these 
effects. The small magnitude of the two effects suggests that little of the variation in tax-paid sales 
can be explained by cross-border purchasing incentives. This is consistent with studies by 
Nagelhout et al. (2014) and Agaku et al. (2016), which both find that in most EU countries only a 
small portion of all smokers reported frequent cross-border cigarette purchasing.  
The fact that the effects of the incentive variables are higher for exports (0.27*0.23) than for 
imports (0.38*0.04) suggests that cross-border cigarette purchasing has a greater effect on sales in 
the exporting country than in the importing country. A similar conclusion can be made from the 
fact that, in different model specifications, the export incentive variables are more often significant 
than the import incentive variables. This could mean that some of the cigarettes purchased across 
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the border are smoked in addition to domestic duty-paid cigarettes, as opposed to being substitutes 
for domestic cigarettes. This implies that overall cigarette consumption would be lower, were it 
not for the availability of lower-priced cigarettes from across the border. Thus, increasing cigarette 
taxes to reduce between-country price differences would curb tobacco use in two ways: first, 
through the effects of price increases on cigarette consumption alone and, secondly, through 
reduced cross-border purchasing.  
The significance of the export incentive variable depends on one country only, i.e. Luxembourg. 
The base elasticities for price and income are not much affected in the models with Luxembourg 
removed, but the export incentive variable is. This, again, suggests that price differences do not 
really have a strong effect on cross-border purchasing. 
Another finding of this study is that patterns in cross-border cigarette purchasing differ by border 
type. Even though incentives to purchase cigarettes from across maritime borders were higher than 
incentives for terrestrial borders (Table 1: 2a vs. 2b), between-country price differences were not 
significantly associated with purchases across maritime borders. This is an expected finding and 
suggests that a large area of water poses a barrier for cross-border purchasing in terms of both cost 
and time. Perhaps more interestingly, between-country difference in cigarette prices did not affect 
cigarette purchasing across EU external, terrestrial borders. This is likely because of stricter 
restrictions associated with crossing EU external borders, both in terms of required travel 
documents and in the number of cigarette packs that can be legally transported across those 
borders. This finding suggests that further increases in EU cigarette prices, which increase the 
price differences with non-EU neighbors, are not expected to impact cross-border purchases from 
outside of the EU significantly. Thus, the larger price differences with non-EU countries should 
not distort the functioning of the EU internal market.  
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The findings of this study consistently indicate that cigarette prices affect cigarette sales. Even 
when the effects of cross-border purchases are controlled for, higher prices are effective in 
reducing cigarette demand. Estimated price elasticity varies from -0.47 to -0.35, depending on the 
model specification. This suggests that a 10% increase in cigarette prices reduces cigarette sales 
by 3.5% to 4.7%. These findings are consistent with other studies from the EU (S Gallus et al. 
2006; Nguyen, Rosenqvist, and Pekurinen 2012) and with abundant evidence from other high-
income countries (IARC 2011). The estimated income elasticity, ranging from 0.66 to 0.70, is also 
within the expected range (IARC 2011). These findings confirm that higher tobacco taxes that lead 
to higher cigarette prices in the EU will significantly reduce demand for cigarettes in the EU, 
improving public health and reducing tobacco-related costs. Because higher income is associated 
with higher cigarette sales, future tax increases need to account for the effects of growing income, 
to make cigarettes less affordable over time (Blecher, Ross, and Leon 2013). 
According to Model 1, non-price tobacco control measures affected cigarette sales in the EU. If a 
country does well on all four non-price variables, it can expect to decrease cigarette consumption 
by 7-8%. 
This study also contributes to research on new methods for estimating tobacco tax avoidance and 
evasion. This is the first study of cross-border purchasing across the entire European Union 
conducted using the econometric modelling of cigarette demand. Secondly, unlike previous studies 
based on the Eurobarometer and the ITC Project surveys, which captured cross-border purchases 
by the smokers themselves, this study captures all forms of cross-border purchases. Thirdly, 
creating separate import and export incentive variables by border type (internal versus external 
borders and terrestrial versus maritime borders) was novel. It allowed a distinction to be made 
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between the effects of between-country price differences on cross-border cigarette purchasing 
within the EU and the effect on cross-border trading with neighbouring non-EU countries.  
The fact that findings from this study are consistent with findings from studies based on survey 
data (Nagelhout et al. 2014; Agaku et al. 2016) suggests that surveys of smokers on their cross-
border purchasing are not affected by  underreporting bias. Methods relying on official data of tax-
paid sales and prices, such as the methods employed in this study, and methods relying on surveys 
of smokers, might both be adequate for measuring the impact of between-country price differences 
on cross-border purchases. These two methods can be used independently, depending on the 
availability of data. Finally, the longitudinal setup of this study permits stronger conclusions about 
the causal relationships between cigarette price differences and cross-border cigarette purchases.  
4.5.1. Limitations 
Even though the EU provides excellent data on the quantity and prices of cigarettes purchased in 
its Member States, the size of the sample constructed on these data is still relatively small. As a 
result, there may be imprecise estimates and lack of significance for some of the variables. 
Secondly, although the number of cigarettes released for consumption should closely reflect the 
tax-paid sales in the EU Member countries, it is not an exact measure of sales, especially in 
countries without anti-stockpiling rules in place. Thirdly, the fact that the EU switched from 
reporting MPPC to reporting WAP affected the quality of the price measure used in this study. 
However, this switch should be picked up by the models’ year fixed effects. Fourthly, the fact that 
the price data used for the neighboring non-EU countries came from an unofficial commercial 
source (Euromonitor) could be problematic. It is likely that the data collected by the European 
Commission are of better quality than the price measure for some non-EU countries, such as Syria, 
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for which Euromonitor provides only modeled estimates. This might have affected the estimate of 
cross-border purchasing between EU and non-EU countries. Fifthly, the estimates of border 
populations for years other than 2011 were not available. Therefore, any change in border 
population throughout the period of this analysis might have affected the accuracy of the incentive 
variables. However, weighting the cross-border price differences by yearly gasoline prices instead 
of by the 2011 border population did not change the results substantively, which suggests that the 
results are robust to the type of weight used for the cross-border price difference. Sixthly, there is 
no EU-wide, longitudinal, database for annual data on non-price tobacco control measures, such 
as smoking bans or advertising bans. Consequently, values for these other tobacco measures were 
imputed for every other year from 2008 to 2017. Seventhly, while some non-Schengen EU 
countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Romania, and the UK, still have some border control, 
borders between countries that belong to the Schengen block are virtually non-existent. This might 
result in an uneven enforcement of the limits on the number of cigarette packs that can be legally 
transported across EU borders, which could affect the findings. Eighthly, the models use the 
weighted average prices, which do not capture the variability in cigarette prices within each 
country. In reality, the cross-border purchasing might be driven more by the differences between 
prices of the cheapest cigarette brands rather than by the differences in the average prices. 
However, no good yearly data on the price of the least expensive brand exists to test this 
hypothesis. Finally, the study presented in this chapter focuses on substitution to cigarettes from 
across the border only. Due to the lack of European Commission data on prices of tobacco products 
other than cigarettes, the problem of the substitution to other tobacco products was not addressed 
in this chapter. However, despite the shortcomings, the model produces results that are robust, 
with the estimated effects having the expected signs. 
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4.5.2. Study application 
In late 2017, the European Commission Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG 
TAXUD) commissioned a study on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured 
tobacco. The aim of that study was to contribute to the Commission’s evaluation report and to a 
possible impact assessment on the review of Directive 2011/64/EU. The study also analyzed and 
reported on the market developments of new products such as e-cigarettes and heated tobacco 
products. The study has been commissioned to a consortium led by Economisti Associati Srl., a 
research group based in Bologna, Italy, and was scheduled to be carried out from January to 
November 2018. The study involved, among other things, interviews with competent authorities 
in the EU member states, economic operators, industry and producers’ associations, non-state 
actors and other relevant stakeholders. The results of the study described in this chapter were 
shared with Economisti Associati and they will become a part of the report for the European 
Commission and, therefore, will serve to inform the policymaking process in Europe. 
4.6. Conclusions 
This study finds that differences in cigarette prices across the EU Member States significantly 
affect cigarette purchasing across internal, terrestrial, EU borders. No such effect was found for 
cigarette purchasing across maritime borders or for cross-border cigarette trading with countries 
from outside the EU. These findings underscore the need for further efforts to harmonize taxation 
within the EU, particularly through increasing minimum tobacco tax rates, as is required in the 
Tobacco Tax Directive, which will also have a positive public health effect. Increases in minimum 
tobacco tax rates, resulting in higher cigarette prices and in the convergence of those prices across 
the Member States, would improve public health by contributing to decreases in cigarette 
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consumption and ensuring proper functioning of the internal EU cigarette market by removing 
some market imperfections through reduced cross-border cigarette purchasing. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides analysis of three aspects of tobacco product switching: (1) price-driven, 
between-product substitution, (2) switching to newly-introduced tobacco products, and (3) 
switching to products on which domestic tax has not been paid. All three switching behaviors 
undermine the effectiveness of tobacco taxation. In the first instance, when many smokers are 
switching between products after a tobacco tax increase, instead of quitting or cutting back on their 
use, the public health effect of the tax is undermined. In addition, by switching to other tobacco 
products, smokers avoid or evade tobacco taxes, which decreases governments’ tax revenue 
streams. The ability to account for and predict such switching behaviors is critical in the design of 
more effective tax systems and in implementing other evidence-based policies aimed at reducing 
cigarette use.  
In 2016, the US National Cancer Institute and the World Health Organization concluded that 
research studies on cross-price effects on the use of tobacco products in any country are scarce, 
and practically non-existent for low- and middle-income countries (U.S. National Cancer Institute 
and World Health Organization 2016). The few existing studies generally show that when the ratio 
of tobacco product prices changes, consumers sometimes choose to switch between products. This 
suggests that governments should aim for tax parity across products when substitution of similarly 
harmful products, such as between FM and RYO cigarettes, is likely. All combustible tobacco 
products are very harmful because the preponderance of carcinogens and toxins are generated by 
the combustion. Aware of smokers’ switching behaviors, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
notes that taxing all tobacco products comparably reduces incentives for substitution; the need for 
comparable taxation on all tobacco products is increasingly clear (World Health Organization 
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2015b). This approach to reducing between-product price differentials through tobacco taxation is 
also recommended in the Article 6 guidelines of the WHO FCTC (WHO FCTC 2014). 
This issue of between-product switching, the role the product prices play in the switching behavior, 
and the implications for policymakers who want to design tobacco tax systems aimed at reducing 
tobacco use are examined in the second chapter of this thesis. The analyses presented in the chapter 
utilize individual-level data obtained from the 2012 and 2014 waves of the International Tobacco 
Control (ITC) Zambia Survey. In Zambia, the number of cigarette users is growing, and the lack 
of strong tax policies is likely to be an important cause. When adjusted for inflation, levels of 
tobacco tax in Zambia have not changed since 2007. Moreover, roll-your-own (RYO) tobacco, a 
less-costly alternative to factory-made (FM) cigarettes, is widely used and easily accessible 
throughout the country. The study models the probability of FM and RYO cigarette smoking, as 
well as between-product substitution, using two estimation methods: a standard estimation method 
involving separate random effects probit models and a method involving a system of equations 
(incorporating a bivariate seemingly unrelated random effects probit) to estimate price elasticities 
of FM and RYO cigarettes and their cross-price elasticities. The longitudinal design of the ITC 
Zambia Survey permits strong inferences about causal relationships between price and the use of 
FM and RYO cigarettes, while the use of a system of equations allows for more precise analyses 
of the impact of price on the use of FM and RYO cigarettes and of the degree of their 
substitutability. 
This study argues that tax-led price increases could significantly reduce cigarette use in Zambia. 
Furthermore, reducing between-product price differences would reduce substitution from FM 
cigarettes to RYO. Since RYO use is associated with lower socio-economic status, efforts to 
decrease RYO use, including through tax/price approaches and cessation assistance, would 
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decrease health inequalities in Zambian society and mitigate the negative economic consequences 
of tobacco use experienced by the poor. The findings from this study can be used by policymakers 
seeking to reduce tobacco product use through tax-induced price increases and to advance public 
health by designing tax policies intended to decrease the between-product price differentials. 
Global tobacco markets are undergoing large shifts: with the proliferation of many new tobacco 
products, such as e-cigarettes and HTPs, traditional cigarettes are losing market share. In such 
cases, the between-product switching might not be driven simply by price differences across 
different product types, but rather by the increased variety of product types on the market and/or 
the different characteristics of these products. The 2014-2016 introduction of a heated tobacco 
product, IQOS, in Japan is a case in point. Philip Morris International, one of the largest 
transnational cigarette manufacturers, has heavily invested in its new product, IQOS, marketing it 
aggressively as a less harmful alternative to cigarette smoking. However, the company’s assertions 
that the product replaces cigarettes have never been independently tested.  
The objective of the study presented in the third chapter of this thesis is to determine whether the 
introduction of IQOS affected cigarette sales in a large economy. The study makes use of a natural 
experiment created during the rollout of IQOS in 2015 and 2016 in Japan. Monthly retailer panel 
data on cigarette sales in eleven Japanese regions from 2014 to 2018 are linked with IQOS 
introduction dates in those regions. A Chow test is used to determine whether trends in cigarette 
sales have changed with IQOS introduction in each region. A series of placebo models are 
estimated to test if events other than IQOS introduction could have better explained trends in 
cigarette sales in Japan. The analysis is conducted using three alternative ways to define the date 
of IQOS regional introduction for regions with partial initial coverage. 
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The study found that per capita cigarette sales substantially declined at the time of the introduction 
of IQOS heated tobacco products in each of eleven Japanese regions. Trends in cigarette sales are 
explained substantially better when the regions are assigned their IQOS introduction months, than 
when any one month is applied to all regions (a national-level exogenous shock), and compared to 
all possible permutations of the true IQOS introduction months among the regions. These results 
show that the introduction of IQOS likely reduced cigarette sales in Japan, while combined product 
volumes remained broadly unchanged. The net population health impact, however, cannot be 
assessed without resolving several key uncertainties related to the direct harms of IQOS and the 
patterns of both smoking and IQOS use. 
Large differences in cigarette prices between geographical regions might also lead to tobacco 
product substitution similar to that described in the second chapter of this thesis. The existence of 
between-region price differences might incentivize some smokers from regions with higher 
cigarette prices to switch to cheaper cigarettes available across the border in another tax 
jurisdiction (e.g., a state, province or country). This substitution undermines the effects of tobacco 
tax policies, because instead of quitting or cutting back smoking, some smokers switch to less 
expensive undutied cigarettes. Moreover, the threat of illicit trade in tobacco products is being 
used by the tobacco industry as an argument against implementation of new tobacco control 
measures. Yet evidence on determinants of this kind of switching behavior and in particular the 
role tobacco=product prices play in driving this behavior, is limited. Policymakers need such 
analyses to inform the development of new tobacco tax policy. 
Accordingly, the chapter analyses the association between prices and cross-border cigarette 
purchases in the EU, using potentially richer data. Previous studies of cross-border cigarette 
purchases in the region relied on survey-reported data—e.g., Eurobarometer and the ITC Project 
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surveys—and therefore their results might be affected by underreporting of tax avoidance in the 
surveys. This analysis aims to shed light on the effects of cigarette price differences between EU 
Member States on cross-border cigarette purchases using a method that is free from potential 
reporting bias. Previous studies captured cross-border purchases by smokers themselves, whereas 
this study captures all forms of cross-border purchases. The study uses 2004-2017 official 
European Commission data and Becker’s seminal methodology to disentangle the effects of higher 
cigarette prices on cigarette demand in the EU. Incentives for cross-border purchasing are 
measured as a function of differences in cigarette prices between bordering countries, controlling 
for population density near borders. Separate incentive variables are calculated for EU internal 
versus EU external borders and for terrestrial versus maritime borders. Tax-paid cigarette sales are 
modelled as a function of cigarette price, per capita income, non-price measures, and incentive 
variables using fixed-effects models.  
The study finds that an upward convergence of cigarette prices across EU Member States would 
reduce cross-border cigarette purchasing and improve public health by contributing to a decline in 
cigarette consumption. Between-country price differences are not significantly associated with 
purchases across maritime borders and across borders with non-EU neighbors. In an average EU 
country, however, only about 1.5% of tax-paid sales are lost due to cross-border purchasing from 
neighboring countries with lower cigarette prices.  
This is the first study of cross-border purchasing across the entire European Union using an 
econometric modelling of cigarette demand. Including separate import and export incentive 
variables by border type in the model (internal vs. external borders and terrestrial vs. maritime 
borders) is a new strategy and helps identify, for the benefit of policymakers and enforcement 
officials, the types of border (i.e. maritime or terrestrial) that are most likely to be crossed for 
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cigarette purchasing. The study validates survey-based methods that examine cross-border 
purchasing. The finding that the estimates from this study are similar to those from the surveys is 
important, because currently much of the surveillance of cross-border cigarette purchases relies on 
surveys of smokers. The longitudinal setup of this study permits strong inferences about the causal 
relationships between cigarette price differences and cross-border cigarette purchases. 
5.1. Policy implications 
The findings from the studies presented in this dissertation reveal a number of important policy 
implications. The second chapter demonstrates that WHO FCTC guidelines pertaining to the 
unification of tax rates between different combustible tobacco product types might not be sufficient 
to reduce between-product substitution. Even though the tax rates on FM and RYO cigarettes in 
Zambia were equal, RYO tobacco was still substantially cheaper than FM cigarettes, most likely 
as a result of poor tax compliance for locally-farmed and informally-sold tobacco. Therefore, 
governments that consider unifying taxes across tobacco product types should also consider other 
measures to ensure tax compliance. These can include better monitoring of the tobacco supply 
chain or higher fines for retailers or farmers who sell products outside the official tobacco supply 
chain. 
Under some circumstances, if one subscribes to the concept of harm reduction, price differentials 
incentivizing such substitution may be desired, when high-risk tobacco products are substituted to 
significantly lower-risks products. For example, the government of Sweden has historically kept 
taxes for snus (a form of lower-harm, smokeless tobacco) at lower levels than taxes for cigarettes, 
deliberately creating the price difference between these products to incentivize cigarette smokers 
to switch to snus (Sweanor, Alcabes, and Drucker 2007). This was an intentional decision by 
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policymakers, because the use of Swedish snus is associated with a lower risk of cancers and 
cardiovascular diseases than cigarette smoking (Rodu and Cole 2009). Swedish men, in particular, 
have switched to snus, and tobacco-related deaths for men have dropped markedly compared to 
those of neighboring countries and of Swedish women (Ramström and Wikmans 2014). 
The third chapter found that new electronic tobacco products can substitute for the old combustible 
products when the new product enters the market. In this particular case, the health risks of the 
new products, especially of HTPs, are still largely unknown. However, if these new products are 
found to be substantially less harmful to use than combustible cigarettes, reducing price differences 
to disincentivize switching between different tobacco products might no longer be optimal from a 
public health perspective. In such cases, if quitting tobacco products altogether is not a realistic 
goal, incentivizing a current smoker to switch to using the less harmful product could reduce that 
smoker’s risk of developing cancer, cardiovascular disease, or other diseases caused by smoking 
tobacco.  
It is necessary to understand the ways in which the harm associated with the use of these new 
products can be reduced in order to form policies to regulate that use. Wisely managed, 
government policies could use the introduction of less-harmful products to reduce overall tobacco-
related harm and advance public health. For example, taxes on less-harmful new products could 
be used to raise prices so as to deter initiation by never users (particularly youth). At the same 
time, taxes on combustible products could be raised substantially higher than taxes on the lower-
harm products in order to give current smokers an incentive to switch from combustible products 
to less-harmful ones, particularly those smokers who have had difficulty quitting using other 
means or who would like to continue using nicotine products. 
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The study presented in the fourth chapter of this thesis also has important policy implications. The 
study shows that European policymakers should not heed the tobacco industry’s alarmist narrative 
of rising tax avoidance and evasion. The scope of cross-border cigarette purchasing in the EU is 
not large and an upward harmonization of cigarette prices across EU Member States would help 
to further reduce the scope of the problem. The study did not find that differences in cigarette 
prices between EU member countries and neighbouring non-EU countries had a significant impact 
on cross-border purchasing. This suggests that factors other than price are likely to determine the 
scale of the illicit cigarette trade from those countries. Most importantly, the study indicates that 
further tax increases in the EU, reducing variation in cigarette prices across the EU, would not 
only lead to reduced cross-border purchasing, but also to a decrease overall cigarette consumption. 
This would improve the health of EU residents and contribute to the Union’s economic progress 
through lower healthcare costs and the higher productivity of a healthier population. Because the 
study finds higher income to be associated with higher cigarette sales, future tax increases need to 
account for the effects of growing income, to make cigarettes less affordable over time. 
5.2. Further research 
The research presented in this thesis is a starting point for further research in several key areas: 
• The findings from the second chapter show that tobacco taxes need to be accompanied by 
strong measures to assure tobacco tax compliance. Little guidance in this matter is available 
for countries, particularly those with limited enforcement resources. In this case, it is clear 
that more research should be conducted to find viable policy options for increased tax 
compliance in lower-capacity tobacco farming countries, such as Zambia, where the 
likelihood of tobacco being sold in the informal sector is strong. 
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• These findings also indicate that the most-commonly used techniques to estimate between-
product substitution are not perfect. Estimating demand equations for each product 
separately assumes that the error terms between the two models are uncorrelated. This is 
probably an unrealistic assumption because the decisions to smoke one product or to smoke 
another are almost certainly linked. Further research should address this issue by estimating 
the equations simultaneously, such as by using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
technique, where the error terms from the two models are allowed to be correlated. 
• The research presented in the third chapter examined whether the event of IQOS 
introduction affected trends in cigarette sales. With so few cases analyzed to date, 
additional research on the issue of the exact rates of product substitution is needed.  
• Additionally, throughout the period of analysis presented, product prices were practically 
the same for IQOS and regular cigarettes, and both stayed unchanged over time. It is 
important to seek other data with variability in prices to examine the role that the relative 
prices of the two products played in IQOS and cigarette use. 
• There are aspects of the cigarettes-to-IQOS replacement that cannot be determined from 
sales data alone. A reduction in sales that is driven by reduced smoking initiation or by 
increased smoking cessation would potentially have far more clinical meaning than one 
driven by a prolonged reduction in smoking intensity among dual users (e.g., using both 
cigarettes and IQOS) because the harm from smoking is not linear (i.e., smoking only a 
few cigarettes per day generates as large a proportion of the harm as smoking 10 or more 
cigarettes). These relationships can only be examined using individual surveys of cigarette 
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and IQOS users. Therefore, future research should examine individual-level tobacco 
product use. 
• Findings from the fourth chapter indicate that regional tobacco tax harmonization efforts 
can be effective not only in reducing tobacco consumption, but also in reducing cross-
border purchasing of tobacco products. Yet, other than in the EU, there has been little 
success in regional tobacco tax harmonization efforts. Future research should focus on the 
feasibility of using the EU experience to implement similar tax harmonization efforts in 
other regions of the world. 
• Lastly, the effects of smokers switching behaviors are not incorporated in, and therefore 
cannot be predicted by, most existing economic models used by large organizations, 
because these models typically focus on cigarettes only. Findings from all three studies 
presented in this thesis demonstrate significant effects of those switching behaviors. 
Therefore, researchers should work to incorporate smoker’s switching behaviors into 
existing models that are being used to inform tobacco tax policy change better. 
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